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Towards an Understanding of
Litigation as Expression: Lessons
from Guantánamo
Kathryn A. Sabbeth∗
Civil rights litigation has been recognized for over fifty years as core
First Amendment activity, but governments often censor indirectly that
which they cannot censor outright. In the War on Terrorism, the U.S.
government has imposed indirect burdens on First Amendment freedoms
and access to courts. This Article explores prior Supreme Court
jurisprudence interpreting litigation as political expression and asks to
what extent this doctrine can survive today. The Article focuses on the
chilling effects of the Terrorist Surveillance Program (“TSP”), a
warrantless wiretapping program imposed shortly after 9/11. Prior
literature on the TSP has focused largely on individual rights protected by
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, but this Article highlights the
First Amendment values at stake and, in particular, examines the First
Amendment implications of wiretapping lawyers. Rather than utilize
existing First Amendment theory to interpret the effects of the TSP,
however, this Article turns the inquiry around. Drawing on a case study of
twenty-three Guantánamo lawyers who believe they were targeted for
surveillance, the Article explores the First Amendment theory of litigation
as expression. The Article concludes that attorneys’ communications in
support of litigation reflect fundamental First Amendment values tied to
political expression, but implementing protection for lawyers’
∗
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communications presents significant doctrinal challenges, particularly
with respect to defining the scope of litigation to be recognized as political
and the type of communications to be included within the constitutional
protection. The Article proposes a five-factor test to assist courts with
identifying litigation that qualifies as political expression and proposes
future research on the implications of recognizing First Amendment values
in lawyers’ work.
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INTRODUCTION
Providing “expert advice or assistance” to a terrorist organization
constitutes a federal crime.1 In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,2
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this restriction as
applied to two U.S. citizens and six human rights organizations that
had, inter alia, offered training in the negotiation of peace agreements
and preparation of petitions to the United Nations.3 The Court ruled
that this statutory ban violated none of the plaintiffs’ free speech or
association rights.4
A question the Supreme Court did not reach, though the Ninth
Circuit had considered it below,5 was whether the language of the
statute prohibited the filing of an amicus brief.6 It is not surprising
that the Court steered clear of such territory. Had the Court upheld a
prohibition on litigation by political organizations advocating for civil
rights, it would have run into conflict with NAACP v. Button7 and its
progeny,8 under which, for more than half a century, it has been well
settled that such advocacy is highly protected as core First
Amendment activity.
As others have demonstrated, however, government actors often
censor indirectly that which they cannot forbid outright, and in
periods of war and national anxiety, such actors have historically
restricted civil liberties and access to courts.9 In this Article, I explore
the notion of litigation as political expression, a notion that the Court
previously developed to protect the advocacy of the NAACP and
ACLU, and I ask whether and to what extent this doctrine can survive
the current pressures of national security. I suggest that attorneys’
communications in support of litigation reflect fundamental First
Amendment values tied to political expression, but implementing
18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b)(1) (West 2010); id. § 2339B(a)(1).
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
3
Id. at 2713, 2720, 2729.
4
Id. at 2730-31.
5
See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 930 (9th Cir. 2009).
6
Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2719.
7
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-31 (1963).
8
See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426-32 (1978).
9
See Tamar R. Birckhead, The Conviction of Lynne Stewart and the Uncertain
Future of the Right to Defend, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 14-26 (2006) (describing
evolution of political repression from World War I to War on Terrorism); David Cole,
The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 4-15 (2003) (same).
1
2
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protection for lawyers’ communications presents a number of
doctrinal challenges.
To explore this concept, I examine the Terrorist Surveillance
Program (“TSP”), a warrantless wiretapping program that has not
outlawed First Amendment activities but has significantly chilled
them. Almost immediately after September 11, 2001, President George
W. Bush launched a series of warrantless surveillance programs, which
came to be known collectively as the TSP, and authorized the National
Security Agency (“NSA”) to engage in electronic monitoring of
communications without judicial review.10 Widespread controversy
erupted after the TSP became public in 2005, and, three years later,
then-Senator Barack Obama campaigned as one of its critics.11 Today,
however, the Obama administration refuses to take a position on the
constitutionality of the TSP, and, further, it argues that no court
should be able to rule on this question.12 Prior literature on the TSP
and other post-9/11 wiretapping programs has focused primarily on
individual rights protected by the Fourth,13 Fifth,14 and Sixth
Amendments,15 but, as the Supreme Court has noted, “dread of
10
See President George W. Bush, President’s Radio Address (Dec. 17, 2005)
(transcript on file with New York Times), [hereinafter Bush Radio Address] available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/17/politics/17text-bush.html?_r=1.
11
See Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, U.S. Wiretapping of Limited Value, Officials
Report, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2009, at A1; Anne Broache, Obama: No Warrantless
Wiretaps If You Elect Me, CNET NEWS, Jan. 8, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/830110784_3-9845595-7.html.
12
Transcript of Proceedings at 5-7, Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60 (2d
Cir. 2009) (No. 08-4726) (transcript on file with author); Christine Kearney, Obama
Lawyer Says No Position on Bush-Era Wiretaps, REUTERS, Oct. 9, 2009, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5985I720091009?feedType=RSS&feedName=
politicsNews (reporting on comments at oral argument).
13
See, e.g., Michael Avery, The Constitutionality of Warrantless Electronic
Surveillance of Suspected Foreign Threats to the National Security of the United States, 62
U. MIAMI L. REV. 541, 587-99 (2008) (arguing TSP violates Fourth Amendment);
Wilson R. Huhn, Congress Has the Power to Enforce the Bill of Rights Against the Federal
Government; Therefore FISA Is Constitutional and the President’s Terrorist Surveillance
Program Is Illegal, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 537, 564-75 (2007) (same); see also Teri
Dobbins, Protecting the Unpopular from the Unreasonable: Warrantless Monitoring of
Attorney Client Communications in Federal Prisons, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 295, 329-46
(2004) (analyzing monitoring by Bureau of Prisons).
14
For a discussion exploring the Fifth Amendment right to due process and to
counsel, see Kristen V. Cunningham & Jessica L. Srader, The Post 9-11 War on
Terrorism . . . What Does It Mean for the Attorney-Client Privilege?, 4 WYO. L. REV. 311
(2004).
15
A number of critics focusing on the monitoring of attorney-client
communications in federal prisons have argued that such monitoring interferes with
the attorney-client privilege and violates criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment
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subjection to an unchecked [government] surveillance power” can
hamper both private and public expression and the exchange of
ideas.16
This Article focuses on the First Amendment interests at stake in the
TSP17 and, in particular, examines the First Amendment implications
of wiretapping lawyers. Rather than utilize existing First Amendment
theory to interpret the effects of the TSP, however, I turn the inquiry
around. Drawing on a case study of twenty-three Guantánamo lawyers
who believe they were targeted for surveillance, I use this example to
explore the possibilities for a First Amendment theory of litigation as
expression.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief review of the
design of the American adversary system. Part II draws an analogy
between the philosophical underpinnings of the adversary system and
core philosophies underlying freedom of speech. Part III reviews
Supreme Court doctrine protecting litigation as political expression
and lawyers as those who make that expression effective. Part IV
introduces the case study of Guantánamo lawyers threatened with
warrantless surveillance. This part describes the surveillance, details
rights. See Birckhead, supra note 8, at 2-6; Avidan Y. Cover, A Rule Unfit for All
Seasons: Monitoring Attorney-Client Communications Violates Privilege and the Sixth
Amendment, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1233, 1244-55 (2002); Chris Ford, Fear of a
Blackened Planet: Pressured by the War on Terror, Courts Ignore the Erosion of the
Attorney-Client Privilege Effective Assistance of Counsel in 28 C.F.R.§ 50.3(D) Cases, 12
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 51, 53-54 (2006); see also Martin R. Gardner,
The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Its Underlying Values: Defining the Scope of
Privacy Protection, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 464-65 (2000). Terri Dobbins
points to the need for an analysis beyond Sixth Amendment theory because large
numbers of persons, such as material witnesses and persons arrested but not formally
charged, are subject to monitoring but not entitled to Sixth Amendment rights. See
Dobbins, supra note 13, at 338.
16
United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972); see id. at 313
(“National security cases . . . often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth
Amendment values.”); see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 n.4 (1977)
(discussing potential chilling effects of electronic eavesdropping); United States v.
DiDomenico, 78 F.3d 294, 299 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.) (distinguishing systematic,
public monitoring from isolated incident and stating that totalitarian system of
monitoring would necessarily interfere with freedom of communication).
17
See ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
(ruling that TSP violated First and Fourth Amendments, separation of powers,
Administrative Procedures Act, and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act), rev’d,
ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2007) (dismissing case for
lack of standing); Scott Michelman, Who Can Sue Over Government Surveillance?, 57
UCLA L. REV. 71, 78-79 (2009) (identifying privacy and First Amendment effects of
TSP); see also Seth F. Kreimer, Watching the Watchers: Surveillance, Transparency, and
Political Freedom in the War on Terror, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 133, 162 (2004).
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its effects on the lawyers’ communications, and identifies the impact
on the litigation in which they have been engaged. Part V draws on the
Guantánamo case study to further the theory of litigation as political
expression. It highlights five factors, reflected in Supreme Court
jurisprudence and the Guantánamo example, that help to define the
category of litigation that ought to be recognized as political
expression. Part V also considers additional questions about the scope
of communications to be protected. The Article concludes with
remarks regarding potential implications of recognizing First
Amendment values in lawyers’ work.
I.

BACKDROP OF AMERICAN ADVERSARY SYSTEM

In the American court system, the development of the case is largely
the responsibility of the parties. Lawyers are capable of and
responsible for investigations as officers of the court.18 The judiciary
generally does not conduct its own fact-finding but instead relies on
the adversaries to exchange evidence and then bring relevant facts and
legal arguments to the attention of the court.19 This distinguishes the
American judiciary from other branches of the U.S. government20 and
from courts in other nations, which take an inquisitorial approach.21
Both American common law and federal rules of procedure and
evidence have developed to aid the lawyer in performing her
obligations as a zealous advocate.22 A catalogue of all such features of
the adversary system is beyond the scope of this Article and
unnecessary to develop a theory of litigation as First Amendment
activity. As an entry point to the constitutional discussion, this section
of the Article will focus on the protections for attorney
communications.
The American legal system has historically provided varying degrees
of protection for the privacy of lawyers’ communications with clients,

18
See e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37 (defining rules of discovery process); FED. R. CIV.
P. 45(a)(3) (granting attorneys power to issue and sign subpoenas as officers of court).
19
See, e.g., Matthew T. King, Security, Scale, Form, and Function: The Search for
Truth and the Exclusion of Evidence in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Justice Systems, 12
INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 185, 207-10 (Fall 2001 – Spring 2002). Judges and clerks may
conduct legal research beyond that which is included in parties’ briefs, but courts
generally rule on the arguments presented and do not issue advisory opinions.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
See William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 30, 36-38 (1978).
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co-counsel, and others in the course of representation.23 The oldest
and strongest form of protection is the common law attorney-client
privilege, which, since the sixteenth century, has prevented the
government and other parties from compelling lawyers or clients to
testify about their communications with one another.24 Unless
waived,25 this privilege is generally understood to be an absolute and
inviolate rule of evidence that extends beyond communications
between the attorney and client, and includes the attorney’s
communications with other parties when they reflect communications
between the attorney and client.26
Underlying the attorney-client privilege is the belief that a promise
of privacy encourages candor in communications, which enhances
lawyers’ representation of their clients.27 The premise is that by
encouraging the free flow of information, the privilege helps the
advocate prepare fully and develop complete cognizance of the
strengths and weaknesses in her client’s case.28 While David Luban
23
See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“The [attorneyclient] privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and
that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the
client.”) (citations omitted).
24
See FED. R. EVID. 501. Professor Wigmore’s well-known formulation of the
attorney-client privilege is as follows: (1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2)
from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications
relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his
instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,
(8) except the protection be waived. 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §
2292, at 554 (John T. McNaughton ed., 1961).
25
There are various ways a client can waive the privilege. Notably, many
commentators interpret the crime-fraud exception, pursuant to which
communications made to facilitate a crime or fraud are not covered by the privilege, as
a waiver. The rationale is that, if one abuses the relationship, the relationship is no
longer serving its intended purpose, and the privilege disappears. See, e.g., Clark v.
United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (“[T]he privilege takes flight if the relation is
abused.”).
26
See Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: Continuing Confusion About Attorney
Communications, Drafts, Pre-Existing Documents, and the Source of the Facts
Communicated, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 967, 1005 (1999).
27
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 386-91 (John W. Strong ed., 6th ed. 2006).
28
Some scholarship has suggested that the privilege protects intrinsic values of
dignity and liberty, in addition to serving the instrumentalist goal of encouraging the
exchange of information. The intrinsic value argument has particular appeal in the
criminal context, where, absent the privilege, confiding in a lawyer could be
tantamount to self-incrimination. See, e.g., Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed
Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 485-87 (1977)
(asserting that combination of Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and
Sixth Amendment right to counsel create constitutional right to attorney-client

1494

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 44:1487

and Deborah Rhode have raised interesting questions about the
empirical validity of the assumption that the privilege increases
candor,29 this assumption remains a foundational principle of the
American adversary system.
In 1946, the Supreme Court added the work product doctrine,30
which, in the modern discovery system, exempts material prepared in
anticipation of litigation from compelled disclosure.31 In the discovery
rules, Congress codified the Supreme Court’s earlier insight:
It is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of
privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties
and their counsel. . . . That is the historical and the necessary
way in which lawyers act within the framework of our system
of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients’
interests.32
In addition to aiding the acquiring of factual information, the work
product doctrine creates a safe space for testing out ideas before
presenting them to courts. The doctrine reflects a degree of respect for
the lawyer’s creative process; even its name conveys high regard for
the fruits of the attorney’s labor.33 Such respect rests on the view that
helping to protect and polish the lawyer’s work improves the
privilege for criminal defendants). Yet this does not explain why the doctrine pervades
civil litigation, nor why one’s communications with one’s attorney should receive
stronger protections that those with one’s doctor, clergy, or spouse. See Benjamin H.
Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 453, 465 (2008).
29
See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 242-44 (5th ed. 2009)
(highlighting absence of empirical work demonstrating that privilege increases
candor).
30
See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
31
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
32
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11.
33
See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975) (explaining that attorney
work product doctrine plays a vital role “in assuring the proper functioning of the
criminal justice system . . . . The interests of society and the accused in obtaining a fair
and accurate resolution of the question of guilt or innocence demand that adequate
safeguards assure the thorough preparation and presentation of each side of the
case.”); In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 492 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he purpose of
the work-product immunity has been to avoid chilling attorneys in developing
materials to aid them in giving legal advice and in preparing a case for trial. The fear
of disclosure to adversaries of normal work-product would severely affect
performance of the lawyer’s role . . . .”); Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381
F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1967) (observing that attorney work product doctrine is
“designed to encourage effective legal representation by removing counsel’s fear that
his thoughts and information will be invaded by his adversary if he records them”).
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adversary process. While the work product doctrine is not
impermeable,34 courts have attributed great significance to it,
suggesting that compromising it even slightly could chill attorneys’
thoughts, undermine attorneys’ ability to perform their professional
role, and potentially threaten the functioning of the adversary
system.35
As reflected in the Court’s work product jurisprudence, the
predominant rationale for the privacy shield is that preserving a zone
of privacy improves the quality of the American justice system. One
might reasonably ask why the advocate’s work is accorded such high
status. Criminal cases raise a special set of constitutional
considerations, but even in civil litigation we seem to place a premium
on the creation of conditions under which lawyers can do their best
work. Particularly in the face of countervailing considerations, such as
societal needs for information that would aid the search for truth or
promote the public safety, why do we pride ourselves on blocking the
release of information in the name of perfecting the lawyer’s craft?
Why do we maintain such reverence for the adversary system and
those whose work supports it? The answer I propose is that the
protections for the American adversary system reflect core First
Amendment values.
II.

FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES OF LITIGATION

For the purpose of simplicity, I divide justifications for protecting
freedom of speech into three general categories: (1) individual
autonomy; (2) pursuit of truth; and (3) promotion of democratic
government. Below, I compare the primary values underlying the First
Amendment with those promoted in the adversary system. Daniel
Markovits has noted that the protection of individual rights and the
pursuit of truth parallel First Amendment theories.36 I suggest that the
value of self-government is particularly important to the structure of
the American court system.
34
The doctrine “permits disclosure of documents and tangible things constituting
attorney work product upon a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the
equivalent without undue hardship,” but “accords special protection to work product
revealing the attorney’s mental processes.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
400 (1981).
35
See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975); Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
36
See Daniel Markovits, Adversary Advocacy and the Authority of Adjudication, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1367, 1382 (2006) (suggesting justifications of adversary advocacy
parallel those of democracy).
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A. Individual Autonomy
Some theorists describe free speech as an intrinsically valuable
aspect of individual liberty.37 Under this view, freedom of expression
embodies not merely a positive enactment to advance some
conception of the good, but a pre-political entitlement based in
personal autonomy and free development of one’s faculties.38 Speech
has a core value based in individual self-realization39 and control over
one’s own reasoning process.40 While the autonomy value is most
often associated with the right of the speaker to express herself, it also
protects the listener, whose access to information assists her in making
personal decisions.41
Just as many interpret free speech as a fundamental liberty interest,
the most basic defense of the American court system is that this
structure is uniquely protective of the rights, dignity, and autonomy of
the individual.42 The role of defense counsel is to serve as the client’s
“zealous advocate against the government itself,” and counsel’s
obligations of investigation and disclosure are defined almost entirely
in service of that role.43 Some scholars interpret the maintenance of
the adversary system as inherently valuable.44 They explain that the
structure of the system “keep[s] sound and wholesome the procedure
by which society visits its condemnation on an erring member.”45
Criminal defense attorneys and scholars emphasize the inherent value
of working to “police the police, audit the government, [and] . . . fight
for fairness.”46
37
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
see also C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-69 (1989).
38
See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593
(1982).
39
Id.
40
See David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory
of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62-63 (1974); David A. Strauss,
Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 354 (1991).
41
See Redish, supra note 38, at 593-94.
42
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 2 (1975).
43
MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 20-21
(2002).
44
Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 AM. B. ASS’N J. 1159, 1160-61 (1958).
45
Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30, 35 (H.
Berman ed., 1960).
46
Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of
People Who Do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 925, 957 & n.158 (2000) (citations
omitted).
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Critiques of the individualist free speech philosophy align with
critiques of individualist justifications for the adversary system. Some
First Amendment theorists point out that self-fulfillment may derive
from activities other than speech, and speech should not be assumed
to have a uniquely fundamental relationship to self-actualization.47
One might make a similar comment on the individualist approach to
our legal system: it rationalizes the system as respectful of the
individual’s autonomy but assumes the client’s autonomy as a person
is inextricable from that of her legal case. Perhaps the more one
accepts the notion that verbal expression is fundamental to the
development and exercise of rational capacities, the more one will be
inclined to interpret both freedom of speech and the adversary system
as reflecting intrinsic values of human dignity.48 Moreover, while the
structure of the system may protect criminal defendants’ due process
rights,49 the process of civil litigation does not necessarily include
comparable safeguards. On the contrary, without access to lawyers
with time for adequate representation, many indigent litigants, both
civil and criminal, find their experience in the adversary process quite
disrespectful of their basic dignity.50
B.

Pursuit of Truth

The well-known philosophy of the “marketplace of ideas” suggests
that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas . . . the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market.”51 John Stuart Mill and
others have argued that robust dialogue promotes the pursuit of
truth.52 Individual expression is protected so that messages may enter
the stream of discussion, and people may make better, more informed
choices. Ultimately the dissemination of more ideas is expected to lead
to true or socially good ones. Under this approach, the value of free
47
See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 10 (1971).
48
See also Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 589, 611-12 (1985) [hereinafter Ethical Perspectives]; Richard Wasserstrom,
Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1-14 (1975), reprinted in
RHODE AND LUBAN, supra note 29, at 138.
49
Smith, supra note 46, at 957 & n.158 (citations omitted).
50
See Rhode, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 48, at 611-12 (suggesting
partisanship loses social value on individualist grounds when partisans are allocated
by market forces).
51
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
52
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rappaport ed., Hackett
Publishing Co. 1998) (1859).
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speech is purely instrumentalist: the right of the speaker to express
herself receives even less emphasis than that of the listener to hear the
message communicated. Notably, the truth-seeking philosophy leaves
room to permit government restrictions of false, coercive, or abusive
speech, which does not aid the truth-seeking function.
The second classic argument for supporting the adversary system
and lawyers’ work within it is that they promote the public search for
truth. As discussed earlier, American courts rely on parties to
investigate and present their own cases to an impartial tribunal. Many
believe that this is the best process to ferret out an accurate picture of
events.53 This approach reflects the assumption that a clash of parties’
self-interests will lead to a better result than would be reached if a
single government actor maintained the responsibility and power to
conduct investigations.54
In this way, the adversarial model mimics the philosophy of the
marketplace of ideas.55 Comparable to the free speech philosophy that
rests on the assumption that the dissemination of more ideas will lead
to true or socially good ones, the adversary system is premised on the
notion that litigation will lead to truth and substantive (as well as
procedural) justice. The courtroom is understood as a place for
divergent ideas and evidence to be tested so truth may emerge.56 The
role of the advocate in this system is to present facts and arguments
that challenge the other side and direct the court’s focus. Just as
citizens’ expression is protected so messages may work their way into
the stream of discussion and society can make informed choices, the
53
See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975); Monroe H. Freedman,
Professional Responsibilities of the Civil Practitioner, in EDUCATION IN THE PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 151, 152 (D. Weckstein ed., 1970); Fuller, supra note
45; E. Allen Lind, John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, Discovery and Presentation of
Evidence in Adversary and Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1143-44
(1973). Some point out that numerous rules of procedure, based on both statutes and
the U.S. Constitution, block truth from reaching the forum. While rules based on
individual rights and notions of fairness do regularly trump the need for truth, their
presence does not necessarily disprove the role of truth as a motivating factor for the
design of the system. As just one example, the privilege against self-incrimination may
function to exclude a confession from court, but perhaps the underlying rationale,
beyond a notion of due process, dignity, or burdens, is a concern about coerced
confessions by innocent parties.
54
See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 69-77 (1988)
(suggesting that international comparison reveals flaws in American system); W.
Bradley Wendel, Lawyers as Quasi-Public Actors, 45 ALBERTA L. REV. 83 (2008)
(comparing common law with civil law systems).
55
See, e.g., MILL, supra note 52.
56
See Robert L. Tsai, Conceptualizing Constitutional Litigation as Anti-Government
Expression: A Speech-Centered Theory of Access, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 835, 865-68 (2002).
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lawyer’s ability to acquire and safeguard information and ideas is
protected so that the decision-maker benefits from fully developed
presentations of facts and theories by at least two different
perspectives.
The main flaw in the marketplace outlook can also be identified in
the adversary system.57 A laissez-faire approach to freedom of speech
disproportionally represents the views of those with economic and
political power.58 Similarly, the inequality of access to courts, lawyers,
and resources supporting those lawyers can make faith in the system’s
ability to create substantive justice appear naive or disingenuous.59
Additionally, many of the rules of evidence and procedure protect
strategy and gamesmanship more than full revelation of true facts. Just
as the actors in the free market of ideas may lack full information or
make choices for irrational reasons, so too may the fact-finder in
American courts. Even assuming the accuracy of the adversary system
as a truth-seeking model, one might point out that the actual
administration of the American system is riddled with flaws that
interfere with its capacity as a truth producer.
C.

Promotion of Self-Government

While the design of the adversary system does reflect the values of
respect for individual autonomy and promotion of the search for truth,
the system also rests on a third rationale — one which has been
advanced in defense of freedom of speech but not fully explored as a
basis for the American legal system. This third value is democratic
self-governance. This interpretation emphasizes the place of the First
Amendment in the body of the Constitution as a whole. It highlights
the self-governing role that the Constitution grants to “We the
People.” As First Amendment scholars have noted, political speech
may have particular value because, like a town meeting, it facilitates
public participation in, shaping of, and restrictions on government.
The self-governing value has two related strands: (1) improving the
quality of governance by the people, and (2) facilitating the process of
citizen participation regardless of substantive outcomes.
See Markovits, supra note 36, at 1391.
See, e.g. OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY
USES OF STATE POWER 31-46 (1996); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of
Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (1984).
59
David Udell & Rebekah Diller, Access to Justice: Opening the Courthouse Door
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. AT N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW (2007), available at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/297f4fabb202470c67_3vm6i6ar9.pdf.
57
58
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The first strand resembles the marketplace of ideas,60 in that it aims
to provide a means for better ideas to rise to the top, but it privileges
ideas related to the political sphere. To inform voting and other acts of
civic participation, democratic citizens need a right to exercise their
voices and to hear the voices of others. Because political speech
improves self-government, such speech receives the highest level of
First Amendment protection.
This approach receives particular support from theorists like
Vincent Blasi, for whom the principal purpose of the First Amendment
is to facilitate a check on governmental abuses of power.61 If the
essential function of the First Amendment is to give people the tools
to restrict the government’s power, facilitating criticisms of
government action becomes paramount. For Blasi, rights to acquire
information therefore deserve recognition.62 Citizens with specialized
abilities to understand, disseminate, or respond to information take on
a special role in this constitutional scheme.63
The second strand of thought on self-government takes a far less
elitist stance. It emphasizes the First Amendment value of facilitating
citizen participation. This perspective resembles the autonomy
framework, in that it incorporates an individual right of expression,
yet the goal is the process of deliberation by the people. Under this
view, all citizens have an equal right to participate in and influence
public discourse. The polity benefits from the diversity of views, not
simply because the diversity generates the best ideas, but because the
communicative process is itself essential to a healthy democracy.
60
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (highlighting
“profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT at x-xiii (1948).
61
Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527 (1977) [hereinafter Checking Value]; see also Vincent Blasi,
The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 449-50
(1985) (“[T]he overriding objective at all times should be to equip the first
amendment to do maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance of
unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most able and most
likely to stifle dissent systematically. The first amendment, in other words, should be
targeted for the worst of times.”); see Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First
Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2-5 (1989).
62
Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 61, at 610 (“[T]he key stage of the checking
process is the initial acquisition of information.”).
63
See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 245, 253 (1961); see also Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 61, at 541-42, 547-48;
Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 2353, 2368 (2000).
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Applying this framework, the design of the adversary system reflects
the value of democratic governance.64 The court system increases
public participation in civic discourse and improves self-governance.65
As Robert Tsai emphasized in his insightful piece, Conceptualizing
Constitutional Litigation as Anti-Government Expression: A SpeechCentered Theory of Court Access,66 the adversary system encourages
expression of ideas from parties representing at least two different
views and, thus, promotes a diversity of perspectives. Moreover, the
court provides a forum for presenting those ideas directly to judges,
who embody a branch of government.67 The adjudicative process
allows a back-and-forth exchange between the parties and the court.68
The judiciary must respond to complaints from the public; when a
judge faces a live controversy, she must resolve it one way or the
other. When the judge issues a decision, she creates case law, and,
whether the proceeding is large or small, any litigation that results in a
published opinion involves the public in shaping the law. Certainly,
the majority of decisions do not result in published opinions, but,
even in those cases, the public has set in motion a decision that carries
the force of law and orders social relations, even if only between the
parties and only to preserve the status quo.69
Tsai interprets constitutional litigation as a form of politically
dissident speech.70 He highlights the significance of allowing an
individual member of the public to file a formal complaint criticizing
government action.71 Indeed, in accordance with Blasi’s emphasis on
the checking value of First Amendment activity,72 litigants do set in
64
One might also suggest that, like the expression of dissent, adjudication offers a
peaceful method of solving social problems. See Markovits, supra note 36, at 1386.
65
See Tsai, supra note 56, at 840-51 (describing how court process reflects free
speech values); Judith Resnick, Courts and Democracy: The Production and
Reproduction of Constitutional Conflict 8 (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 164, 2008), available at papers.ssrn.com/
sd3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1148202 (describing courts as democratic institutions
required to hear different views and provide “venues for debating and developing
norms”); see also SEYLA BENHABIB, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic
Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE
POLITICAL 67, 79-80 (Princeton Univ. Press 1996); Fuller, supra note 45, at 35.
66
Tsai, supra note 56.
67
Id.
68
See Fuller, supra note 45.
69
Margaret Tarkington, A Free Speech Right to Impugn Judicial Integrity in Court
Proceedings, 51 B.C. L. REV. 363, 388 & nn.157-58 (2010).
70
Tsai, supra note 56, passim.
71
Id. at 871.
72
See Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 61, at 527.
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motion the process by which the judiciary checks excesses by other
government actors.73 At the same time, although Tsai describes the
court as an almost radical institution that permits ordinary people to
speak truth directly to power,74 parties in constitutional litigation
rarely speak directly to judges — they usually speak through their
attorneys.
This raises a question about the role of lawyers’ speech in the
adversary system.75 If the adversary system provides a forum for
expression that serves the same values as those underlying the First
Amendment, it becomes useful to consider the degree of protection
that should be recognized for the lawyer’s speech in support of her
adversary role. Further, if the adversary system provides special
opportunities for self-government and democratic participation,
perhaps speech in support of litigation ought to receive heightened
protection as political expression. In the next part, I consider Supreme
Court doctrine that initiates this inquiry.
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH TO LAWYERS’ SPEECH IN
SUPPORT OF LITIGATION
Proposing to extend First Amendment protection to speech in
support of litigation relies on the premise that the litigation itself is a
form of in-court speech that can reasonably be accorded full First
Amendment protection. An objection could be made that any freedom
of expression in the courtroom could not be absolute. Procedural and
evidentiary rules, as well as judicial discretion, will impose limits on
time, subject matter, whether to have argument or briefing on certain
issues, or whether certain cases will be heard at all. Christopher Peters
suggests that restrictions on what he terms “adjudicative speech” are
necessary to preserve the opportunity for all litigants to participate
fully and fairly in the decision-making process.76
Yet these rules may fairly be developed like time, place, and manner
restrictions necessary for safety and order. The acceptance of
restrictions on some speech to maintain an environment for diverse
viewpoints may be analogized to curtailing hate speech to increase
public dialogue including minority voices. Similarly, proponents of the
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544 (2001).
Tsai, supra note 56, at 871.
75
Tsai mentions that, under his theory of court access as political speech, lawyers
maintain an independent expressive interest, but he does not elaborate on this
suggestion. Id. at 889.
76
Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L.
REV. 705, 791 (2004).
73
74
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marketplace of ideas viewpoint might staunchly protect speech that
aids the flow of information while still limiting false or coercive
statements, which do not aid decision-making. The existence of some
limits on courtroom speech does not necessarily indicate that courts
are a site where interests in expression are diminished; the limits
could reflect the contrary.77
Scholars and members of the Supreme Court have debated whether
lawyers’ speech should receive lower protection than that of ordinary
citizens’, because of its commercial element,78 or instead heightened
protection because of lawyers’ important role in the adversary
system.79 One seminal case addressed whether states may more sharply
limit lawyers’ speech for the purpose of protecting the adversary
system.80 In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,81 the Supreme Court of
Nevada disciplined a lawyer for making a statement to the press
regarding an ongoing case. Although the State of Nevada alleged no
“clear and present danger” of actual prejudice, it claimed the lawyer
“knew or should have known” his statement had a “substantial
likelihood” of materially prejudicing the trial of his client. The U.S.
Supreme Court had previously mandated the “clear and present
See Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 315, 335 (2008) (highlighting uniqueness of litigation as form of speech for
forum analysis); Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477, 47778 (2004) (highlighting tradition of courts as forums for expressing controversial
viewpoints and communicating with larger public).
78
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 563-65 (1980) (identifying intermediate scrutiny test for commercial speech);
see, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 622-24 (1995) (interpreting
attorney advertisements as commercial speech subject to intermediate scrutiny
pursuant to Central Hudson); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985) (holding that disclosure requirements for attorney advertisements require
only reasonable connection to state’s interest in protecting consumers from
deception).
79
See W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305,
306 (2001) (highlighting competing interests). For an excellent summary of the
contradiction in the law regarding the level of protection for attorney speech, see
Kathleen Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraints
on Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 569-70 (1998). Sullivan
suggests, though she does not develop the idea, that lawyer speech might have special
authority because of the special knowledge or insight provided by the training. Id.; see
also Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence Is Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under the
First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859, 872-74 (1998) (arguing that lower scrutiny of
restrictions on lawyer speech is unconstitutional condition on bar membership, and
lawyer’s speech is protected by First Amendment because it advances societal
interests).
80
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1031-32 (1991).
81
Id. at 1062-76.
77
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danger” standard for regulation of the press during pending
proceedings, but in Gentile it distinguished restrictions on lawyers’
statements to the press as deserving a lower standard of scrutiny.
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained: “Membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions.”82 Although the Court ultimately
ruled that the statute in Gentile was unconstitutionally vague, some
might assert that, following Gentile, lawyers’ speech receives a lower
level of protection than that of ordinary citizens.
A more nuanced interpretation of Gentile can be drawn from Peters’s
theory of adjudicative speech. It is not that lawyers categorically
sacrifice their constitutional protections, but rather that the Court
prioritizes adjudicative speech over other forms. When speech outside
the courtroom can interfere with speech within, the Court gives
precedence to protecting the exchange of ideas within the judicial
system.83 In this sense, the lawyer engaged in litigation might receive
full First Amendment protection necessary to further litigation, but if
her communication could compromise that litigation, it might take a
backseat to adjudicative priorities. One might disagree with the
Court’s assessment that the attorney’s comments to the press in Gentile
threatened to harm the ongoing proceeding; given that the attorney
was responding to earlier publicity that could have prejudiced his
client’s trial, one might interpret the facts in the opposite light.84
Either way, the underlying principle is the same: courts will protect
and allow other government actors to protect adjudicative speech.
The Court’s ambivalence about the regulation of lawyers’ speech is
more pronounced in its split decisions on attorney advertising.85 The
Court has struggled to draw lines between in-person solicitation and
mailed advertisements,86 and solicitation for remunerative legal
Id. at 1066 (quoting In re Rouss, 115 N.E. 782, 783 (N.Y. 1917)).
See id. at 1070-76 (internal punctuation and citations omitted) (emphasizing
importance of “preventing prejudice to an adjudicative proceeding,” and noting that,
“although litigants do not surrender their First Amendment rights at the courthouse
door, those interests may be subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting”).
84
Id. at 1039-43.
85
See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (holding that
restriction on targeted mail advertisements withstood scrutiny); Shapero v. Ky. Bar
Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 479-80 (1988) (striking down restriction on targeted mailings);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 655-56 (1985) (reversing
discipline against attorney for truthful and not misleading statements in advertising,
but upholding discipline for failure to include sufficient information about costs);
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (reversing advertising sanction
against attorney).
86
See, e.g., Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474-75 (suggesting mode of communication is
critical factor).
82
83
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services as opposed to pro bono activity.87 Yet the Court has
consistently protected solicitation for litigation that the Court
recognized as “political.” In those cases, the Court interpreted the
communications of lawyers and their agents in the course of
solicitation as entitled to the highest First Amendment protection.
A. Doctrine on Litigation as Political Expression
The Supreme Court has taken steps towards recognizing speech in
support of litigation as a form of expression entitled to First
Amendment protection, but the grounding and contours of it remain
ambiguous. The Court’s first move in this direction was NAACP v.
Alabama,88 in which it ruled that a state court order requiring the
NAACP to disclose the names and addresses of all of its members and
agents89 unconstitutionally infringed the NAACP’s “freedom to engage
in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas.”90 The Court
held that mandated disclosure of identifying information would chill
members’ exercise of their liberty interest in freedom of association.
The opinion highlighted the close nexus between the freedoms of
association, assembly, and speech, and emphasized the free speech
implications of the state court’s order. Introducing the concept of a
“right to advocate,”91 the Court stated that association is often
necessary to realize “effective advocacy,” especially of dissident
viewpoints.92
Five years later, the Court focused on the role of litigation as a form
of expression, especially on behalf of minorities.93 The Virginia
legislature had expanded that state’s definition of solicitation so that
87
Compare In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 439 (1978) (protecting solicitation as
political speech), with Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978)
(ruling speech was unprotected).
88
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 452 (1958).
89
Lawyers and litigation were not central to the Patterson decision, though they
were included among the agents and activities at issue. The Attorney General of
Alabama had brought an equity suit against the NAACP, alleging that the organization
had opened a local office, recruited members, solicited donations, provided legal and
financial assistance to “Negro” students, and supported a bus boycott in Montgomery,
all while failing to comply with the qualification procedures required before any
foreign entity may conduct business in the State. Id. at 452. It was in the course of this
equity suit that the government sought access to the names and addresses of the
NAACP members and agents. Id. at 453.
90
Id. at 460.
91
Id. at 461.
92
Id. at 460.
93
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963).
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the NAACP’s method of outreach to potential clients now constituted
unlawful activity; the NAACP sought to enjoin the enforcement of the
new law.94 In NAACP v. Button, the Supreme Court ruled that the
NAACP’s “litigation [wa]s not a technique of resolving private
differences” but a “means for achieving equality of treatment by all
government . . . for members of the Negro community in this
country.”95 The Court held that the litigation was entitled to
constitutional protection as a form of “political expression” on which
the new Virginia law infringed.96
The majority of the opinion was devoted to emphasizing the
importance of litigation not only as a means of vindicating the rights
of African-Americans, but also as a process for amplifying the voices of
minority, dissident members of society. According to the Court, it was
even “more important” than the vindication of individual rights that
litigation “makes possible the distinctive contribution of a minority
group to the ideas and beliefs of our society.”97 This language reflects a
view of litigation as a vehicle for the dissemination of political
expression, prioritizing the circulation of a diversity of perspectives.
Notably, the Court was particularly troubled by the quieting of the
litigation because it suspected that alternative channels of
communication were inadequate. Arguably, the NAACP had other
means of communicating its political views, but the Court insisted
that, for “minority, dissident groups . . . association for litigation may
be the most effective form of political association”98 and the “sole
practicable avenue . . . to petition for redress of grievances.”99 This
language fails to parse distinctions between rights of expression and
petition,100 but nonetheless embraces a public law conception of
litigation as an essential means of disseminating a message to
government actors and to larger society.
The high water mark of protection for lawyers’ speech in support of
litigation with a political purpose was In re Primus.101 This case
identified First Amendment protection for a lawyer separate and apart
Id. at 417-18.
Id. at 429.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 431.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 430.
100
Compare Tsai, supra note 56, at 840-51 (interpreting court access as free speech
right), with Garcia, supra note 77, at 336 (interpreting court access as a petition right),
and Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667,
728-31 (2003) (same).
101
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
94
95
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from any right held by a client. Edna Smith Primus was an attorney
practicing in South Carolina who participated in ACLU litigation on a
pro bono basis.102 Upon invitation, she spoke to a group of lowincome women who had been sterilized as a condition of continued
receipt of Medicaid assistance. Primus informed her audience of their
legal rights and the possibility of initiating litigation.103 She later
followed up with one of the women, extending a written offer of free
legal representation by the ACLU. The State of South Carolina
sanctioned Primus for solicitation.104
The Supreme Court held that the punishment violated the lawyer’s
First Amendment rights of political expression and association.
Explaining that Primus’s solicitation was intended to “advance . . .
beliefs and ideas”105 on behalf of “unpopular” causes or clients,106 the
Primus Court extended the notion of protected litigation as described
in Button to include lawyers who may not themselves be a member of a
minority but act upon ideological commitment to representing
unpopular viewpoints or clients.107 Reflecting growing familiarity with
concepts of “[p]ublic [i]nterest [l]aw”108 and “associational aspect[s]
of expression,”109 Primus embraced the notion of litigation as a mode
of political expression and, more specifically, as a particularly valuable
means of voicing political dissent.110
Id. at 414.
Id. at 415-16.
104
Id. at 417-18.
105
Id. at 424.
106
Id. at 427-28.
107
One aspect of Button that appears to have received scant attention is the Court’s
mention that all NAACP attorneys at the time were themselves African-American.
Though it seems doubtful that the Court would have decided the case differently
otherwise, it implies that perhaps attorneys’ right to litigate is limited to those
circumstances in which the lawyers’ activities may be viewed as petitioning for redress
of their own grievances. After Primus, however, it becomes clear that the public
interest lawyer who cannot claim to experience her clients’ plight as her own still
enjoys First Amendment protection for her litigation activities.
108
In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 438 & n.32 (citing Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social
Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 210-14 (1976)).
109
Id. (citing Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of
Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 26 (1964) (highlighting role of association in amplifying
messages to reach broader audiences)).
110
Leading up to Primus, the Court extended First Amendment protection even to
litigation that the Court did not explicitly recognize as political, on the theory that
litigation by union members was protected as part of their right of association. United
Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1971); United
Mineworkers of Am. v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 225 (1967); Bhd. of R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, the
102
103
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The Expressive Role of the Lawyer

In 2001, Justice Kennedy authored Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,
an unusual decision elaborating on the unique role of litigation as a
means of expression and describing lawyers as actors who make
effective expression possible.111 Unlike the cases before it, Velazquez
did not discuss the unique contributions of expression on behalf of
minorities. In fact, though there was a brief reference to the role of
litigation in social change,112 the decision neither cited the litigationas-political-expression precedent nor explicitly identified the speech in
Velazquez as political.
The case addressed whether certain congressional conditions
imposed on the use of Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”) funds,
appropriated by Congress, violated the “rights of LSC grantees and
their clients.”113 The key condition prohibited LSC-funded lawyers,
authorized to represent individual welfare claimants, from raising
arguments challenging then-existing welfare laws.114 Although the
Court invalidated the regulation on First Amendment grounds,115
much of the Court’s reasoning was based on the role of lawyers in
protecting the balance of powers. Explaining that the judiciary relies
on advocates to “present all the reasonable and well-grounded
arguments necessary for proper resolution of [a] case,”116 the Court
ruled that “[r]estricting LSC attorneys in advising their clients and in
presenting arguments and analyses to the courts distorts the legal
system by altering the traditional role of the attorneys.”117
Velazquez endorses the notion of expressive interests particular to
Court reasoned that the right to litigate was essential to preserving those rights
guaranteed by the federal statutes on which the litigation was based. 377 U.S. at 5-6.
In United Mineworkers, which concerned workers’ compensation claims, the Court
expressly denied that Button was limited to political litigation. 389 U.S. at 223. Yet it
was in Primus, where the litigation was political, that the Court ruled that the
government conduct at issue was subject to “the ‘exacting scrutiny applicable to
limitations on core First Amendment rights.’ ” 436 U.S. at 432 (citing Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976)). This stands in direct contrast to the Court’s ruling in
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978), where attorney solicitation
without a political purpose received a much lower level of protection. Primus and
Ohralik were issued the same day, and the juxtaposition suggests that the Court
recognizes the need for higher protection where the litigation is political.
111
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
112
Id. at 548.
113
Id. at 536.
114
Id. at 536-37.
115 Id.
116
Id. at 545.
117
Id. at 544.
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lawyers’ communications in support of litigation. In contrast, Alabama
did not highlight lawyers in particular. Both Button and Primus held
simply that the regulation of lawyers’ speech, even if tied to the
regulation of the profession, was subject to constitutional review like
any other government regulation of expression. The Velazquez Court
goes further and rests its holding on the significance of the lawyer’s
role in a participatory democracy. While the Velazquez Court never
fully embraced the label of viewpoint discrimination, which the
Second Circuit had ascribed to the LSC restrictions,118 the Court found
that the regulations, designed to shield government views from the
test of constitutional litigation, impeded a diverse and vibrant dialogue
meant to occur in court. “[T]he ordinary course of litigation involves
the expression of theories and postulates on both, or multiple, sides of
an issue,” the Court explained. This choice of language emphasizes a
view of the adversary system as one that functions to aid a deliberative
democracy. Justice Kennedy never describes the protected expression
as political, and he makes no mention of cases like Alabama, Button,
and Primus. He does, however, recognize the political implications of
limiting lawyers’ advocacy, stating, “It is fundamental that the First
Amendment was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.”119
Remarkably, the Velazquez Court found that “no alternative
channel” existed for the expression of the message barred by the LSC
regulations.120 This is telling, given that the restriction at issue affected
only litigation, not other forms of advocacy or speech.121 Even with
respect to litigation, the limit applied only to the expression of a
subset of attorneys. The clients were free to communicate to the
judiciary any messages they wished, as long as they did so pro se or
through non-LSC counsel.122 The Court mentioned the unlikelihood
of indigent clients locating alternative counsel, but both the language
Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 769-70 (2d Cir. 1999).
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 548 (internal punctuation and quotation omitted).
120
Id. at 546-47.
121
The Court does not even mention the possibility of nonlitigation forms of
expression or means of redress like petitioning the legislature directly. I do not mean
to overstate the importance of this omission, given that the issue was not before the
Court, and the LSC lawyers are expressly prohibited from lobbying for welfare reform,
but perhaps it implies that, on some level, the Court appreciates that litigation is, if
not the most effective means of political expression for the most vulnerable members
of society as Button highlighted years before, still an essential one. See NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963).
122
See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 546-47.
118
119
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and the logic of the decision suggest a primary concern with the
unlikelihood of the prohibited message finding expression in an
alternative speaker.
Velazquez does not appear to be based on the First Amendment
rights of legal services clients. Unlike criminal defendants, welfare
recipients have not been recognized as possessing a right to a
lawyer.123 Perhaps the case could have been decided on the welfare
recipients’ due process rights, but the Court made no such mention.
Denial of counsel to a civil litigant has generally not been considered
equivalent to a denial of court access.124
The decision is best interpreted as resting on the role of lawyers
expressing messages to courts.125 Comparing the outcome of Velazquez
to that of Rust v. Sullivan,126 decided a decade earlier, adds further
support to this interpretation. In Rust, the Court ruled that a
restriction prohibiting doctors at federally funded clinics from
discussing abortion with patients was constitutionally valid, despite
the fact that, as Justice Scalia points out in his Velazquez dissent, the
clinic patients were “effectively precluded by indigency and poverty
from seeing a health-care provider who will provide abortion-related
services.”127 In Rust, the Court explained, “The financial constraints
that restrict an indigent woman’s ability to enjoy the full range of
constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not of
governmental restrictions on access to abortion, but rather of her
indigency.”128 That the Court interprets the restrictions in Velazquez
so differently suggests it is focused on the role of attorneys, whose
expression the Court views as vital to a functioning democracy.
The Court distinguishes Rust on grounds that imply lawyers’
expressive rights may be more robust than those of other
123
Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963) (establishing
right to appointed counsel for criminal defendants), with Velazquez, 531 U.S at 557
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (highlighting that neither party alleged welfare claimants
enjoyed right to appointed counsel).
124
The closest the Court ever came to recognizing a right to a lawyer as an aspect
of the right to court access may have been Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977),
in which the Court ruled that, to avoid obstructing the right to petition for habeas
corpus, a prison was constitutionally obligated to provide either law libraries or
assistance from persons trained in the law.
125
See also Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281-82
(1985) (ruling that opportunity to practice law is fundamental right for purposes of
Privileges and Immunities Clause).
126
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191-201 (1991).
127
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 557-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at
203).
128

Id.
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professionals. Without overtly embracing the notion of lawyers as
higher in the constitutional order than other professionals, the Court
rules that, while government-funded doctors function as speakers for
the government and can be expected to disseminate the government’s
message, government-funded lawyers, in contrast, are charged with
expressing a “diversity” of perspectives.129 This logic suggests that
there exists some “nomos”130 of a lawyer that goes beyond positive law
and is essentially connected to the advocacy of diverse messages. The
Court highlights that in a welfare case, the government has its own
lawyer to deliver its message, while the LSC attorney serves a different
master. The LSC attorney cannot present the government’s views,
because she functions to present those of her own client.131 The Court
places special emphasis on how Congressional attempts to impose
messages on the LSC lawyers distorts their fundamental role as neutral
partisans.
To the extent that Velazquez implies that lawyers’ expressive rights
are more important in a deliberative democracy than the expressive
rights of others, the Court’s true motivation appears to be that
infringements on lawyers’ activities not only interfere with the
exchange of ideas generally, but also threaten to disrupt the balance of
powers. Drawing on the language of Marbury v. Madison concerning
the “mission of the judiciary,”132 the opinion states repeatedly that
truncating the lawyers’ analysis and presentation of issues deprives the
judiciary of the “informed, independent bar” upon whose “speech and
expression” “courts must depend for the proper exercise of the judicial
power.”133 By undercutting the lawyers, the Court says, Congress
undercuts the judicial branch. Interpreting the LSC intrusions on
lawyers’ work as depriving the courts of their constitutionally
129
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542. Justice Scalia accuses the majority of demonstrating
“improper special solicitude for our own profession.” Id. at 562 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
see Barton, supra note 28, at 455 n.4. For a snapshot of the Court’s views on
journalists’ protection, see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978)
(noting skepticism about chilling effects and risks to journalist’s sources as result of
search of newsroom); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1972) (“[W]e remain
unclear how often and to what extent informers are actually deterred from furnishing
information when newsmen are forced to testify . . . .”); see also Blasi, Checking Value,
supra note 61, at 591-611.
130
Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5-11 (1983).
131
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542 (“The lawyer is not the government’s speaker. The
attorney defending the decision to deny benefits will deliver the government’s message
in the litigation. The LSC lawyer, however, speaks on the behalf of his or her private,
indigent client.”).
132
Id. at 545 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
133
Id. at 545 (citation omitted).
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mandated authority, Velazquez aligns the healthy functioning of the
advocate with proper checks on governmental authority.134
While the cases discussed above suggest that lawyers’
communications in the course of litigation deserve First Amendment
protection, they leave certain questions unanswered. Although a First
Amendment decision, Velazquez did not overtly recognize the political
expression elements of the litigation at issue. Justice Kennedy did not
set his opinion against the background of Button and Primus. For their
part, the earlier cases involving the NAACP and ACLU, while more
explicitly grounded in a right to advocate, existed in a particular
historical context, roughly half a century ago, in which the Court may
have believed that the governmental interest on the other side was
little more than a fig leaf for intentionally thwarting the activities of
civil rights groups. Those rulings, therefore, may not provide the best
indicator of how the Court would rule if faced with a real
governmental interest. In the next part, I consider a present-day
example in which the government’s interest is quite real.
IV. CASE STUDY IN GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE IN LITIGATION
To further the inquiry concerning the level of protection that ought
to be accorded attorneys’ communications in support of litigation, this
part examines a case study of attorneys representing Guantánamo
detainees under the shadow of warrantless wiretapping. The example
of the Guantánamo lawyers’ advocacy and the government
interference with it illustrates the First Amendment values promoted
by litigation and threatened by government intrusions. I begin by
providing some background on the surveillance and the ways in which
the surveillance impeded the lawyers’ fact-gathering and formulating
of theories. I then turn to the First Amendment values at stake.
Finally, I utilize the case study to highlight challenges for formulating
a theory of litigation as expression.
A. Surveillance of Lawyers
On December 17, 2005, President George W. Bush announced that,
in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, he had authorized the
National Security Agency (“NSA”) to engage in a warrantless
surveillance program “to intercept the international communications
of people with known links to Al Qaeda and related terrorist

134

Id.
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organizations.”135 The once-secret program became commonly known
as the Terrorist Surveillance Program (“TSP”). As of 2005, President
Bush had reauthorized the program more than thirty times.136
The TSP authorized the NSA to gather foreign intelligence by
monitoring communications whenever one party was outside the
United States and the government had “reason to believe that at least
one party to the communication” had a “link” to or was “affiliated” or
“associated” with al Qaeda or “related terrorist organizations,”137 was a
member of an organization that the government considered “affiliated”
with al Qaeda,138 or worked “in support of al Qaeda.”139 The
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) confirmed the details of the
surveillance program in a forty-two page White Paper, issued on
January 19, 2006.140 In January 2007, Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales announced the suspension of the TSP,141 but President Bush
expressly reserved the right to reinstitute it at any time.142 Since taking
office, President Obama has not stated otherwise; instead, his
administration has refused to take a position on the constitutionality
Bush Radio Address, supra note 10.
President George W. Bush, Press Conference of the President (Dec. 19, 2005)
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/19/politics/19text-bush.html.
137
See Bush Radio Address, supra note 10; Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, ASK
THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 25, 2006), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ask/
20060125.html.
138
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales and General Michael V. Hayden (Dec. 19, 2005) [hereinafter
Gonzales/Hayden Press Briefing] available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/
library/news/2005/intell-051219-dni01.htm.
139
Id.; General Michael V. Hayden, Address to the National Press Club: What
American Intelligence and Especially the NSA Have Been Doing To Defend the Nation
(Jan. 23, 2006) available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2006/01/hayden012306.html;
see also Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency
Described by the President, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 19, 2006), available at
http://fas.org/irp/nsa/doj011906.pdf [hereinafter DOJ White Paper].
140
DOJ White Paper, supra note 139.
141
See Letter from Attorney Gen. Alberto Gonzales to Senate Comm. on Judiciary
(Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/images/general/asset_upload_
file372_28043.pdf.
142
ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 712 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J., dissenting)
(describing government’s position at oral argument); Modernization of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence, 110th
Cong. 52-53 (2007) (testimony of Michael McConnell, Director of National
Intelligence); Declaration of Joseph J. Brand, Assoc. Dir. of Cmty. Integration, Policy
& Records for the NSA, 2 n.1, Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 07 Civ. 3833(DLC),
2008 WL 2567765 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); James Risen, Administration Pulls Back on
Surveillance Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2007, at A18.
135
136
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of the TSP and has insisted that no court should rule on it.143
The definition of those targeted under the TSP can be interpreted to
include an attorney representing an individual or organization
suspected of terrorist activity. The Department of Defense has
described all detainees in Guantánamo Bay as “terrorists” or “enemy
combatants.”144 Those engaged in representation are necessarily
“associated with” and working “in support of” their clients.145 Lawyers
representing Guantánamo detainees appear to fall within the
Program’s scope.
Targeting Guantánamo lawyers for surveillance would match other
claims by executive officials that the detainees are not entitled to
unfettered access to counsel.146 The possibility of surveillance of
Guantánamo attorneys heightened after the Bush administration began
to claim that the Guantánamo detainees and their counsel were not
entitled to the protections of the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine. During the Bush and Obama administrations, the
federal government has argued to courts that it is entitled to monitor
communications between Guantánamo detainees and their lawyers.147
143
Transcript of Proceedings at 5-7, Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60 (2d
Cir. 2009) (No. 08-4726) (transcript on file with author); Kearney, supra note 12
(reporting on comments at oral argument).
144
All Guantánamo detainees have been determined by the Department of Defense
to be “enemy combatants.” See Gordon England, Sec’y of the Navy, Implementation of
Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV., July 29, 2004, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf; Sgt. Doug Sample,
Rumsfeld Says Media Show Only ‘Negative’ Side of Iraq War, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV.,
June 28, 2005, available at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=16281
(citation omitted).
145
See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712-14 (2010)
(reviewing statute under which legal advice or assistance constitutes providing
“material support”); Alissa Clare, We Should Have Gone to Med School: In the Wake of
Lynne Stewart, Lawyers Face Hard Time for Defending Terrorists, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 651, 667-68 (2005) (arguing government must clarify how material support
statutes will be used with respect to lawyers or no counsel will be able to represent
those accused of terrorist activity without risking criminal prosecution).
146
See David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantánamo, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1981, 1988-92 (2003) [hereinafter Guantánamo].
147
See, e.g., Hicks v. Bush, 452 F. Supp. 2d 88, 99-101 (D.D.C. 2006) (ruling on
government’s motion for order allowing interception of attorney-client
communications); In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174, 186-91
(D.D.C. 2004) (ruling on government’s motion restricting counsel’s access to and use
of client information); Al Odah v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-10 (D.D.C.
2004) (ruling that government could not engage in real-time monitoring of attorneyclient communications or review attorney notes and mail between attorneys and
clients).
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This assertion solidified many attorneys’ suspicions that the
government had few qualms about intercepting their
communications.148
Government officials never stated publicly that Guantánamo
attorneys’ phones were tapped, but, in 2006, Assistant Attorney
General William E. Moschella confirmed that lawyers acting in their
professional capacities were not excluded from TSP surveillance.149
The New York Times reported that two senior DOJ officials admitted
“they knew of . . . a handful of terrorism cases . . . in which the
government might have monitored lawyer-client conversations.”150 In
a few cases, government representatives admitted that attorneys’
communications with clients were monitored. In one situation, the
U.S. Treasury Department inadvertently delivered to an attorney a
logbook, marked “top secret,” which reflected NSA monitoring of her
calls with her client, a Saudi charity.151 In another situation, federal
agents notified Thomas B. Wilner, a partner at Shearman & Sterling
LLP who represents a number of Guantánamo detainees, that he was
probably subject to surveillance.152
The widespread acknowledgements that detainees’ attorneys are
possible targets of surveillance caused “many prominent criminal
defense lawyers [to] say [there] is a well-founded fear that all of their
contacts are being monitored by the United States government.”153 A
group of twenty-three Guantánamo attorneys filed a lawsuit under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),154 seeking records from the NSA
and DOJ indicating whether or not the attorneys have been targeted.155
148
Philip Shenon, Lawyers Fear Monitoring in Cases on Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
28, 2008, at A1.
149
Assistant Attorney General William E. Moschella, Responses to Joint Questions
from House Judiciary Committee Minority Members, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ¶ 4 (Mar. 24,
2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj032406.pdf.
150
Shenon, supra note 148, at A1.
151
Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1194-95 (9th Cir.
2007); Patrick Radden Keefe, Annals of Surveillance: State Secrets, NEW YORKER, Apr.
28, 2008, at 28.
152
Declaration of Thomas B. Wilner ¶ 5, Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 07 Civ.
3833(DLC), 2008 WL 2567765 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) [hereinafter Wilner Decl.]. While the
veracity of the officials’ comments is hard to test, the effect is the same either way:
based on a threat of surveillance by a representative of the U.S. government, Mr.
Wilner’s speech has been chilled.
153
Shenon, supra note 148, at A1.
154
5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2009).
155
Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 387 (2010); William Glaberson, Lawyers for Guantánamo Inmates Accuse U.S. of
Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2008, at A18.
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The Obama administration, like the Bush administration, has refused
to confirm or deny the surveillance.156
The case study contained in this Article draws on anecdotal
evidence from these twenty-three lawyers, all of whom represent
individuals currently or formerly detained in Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba,157 or “next friends”158 engaged in litigation on behalf of detained
family members.159 The attorneys’ statements presented in this Article
are based on declarations publicly filed in the attorneys’ FOIA suit.
This set of lawyers is a mixed sample of staff attorneys at nonprofit,
human rights, and civil rights organizations, partners and associates at
private law firms, and law professors. Through counsel, the clients
have initiated civil actions in federal courts based on constitutional,
statutory, and international human rights claims. These include
petitions for habeas corpus, challenges to conditions of confinement,
and civil rights actions for abuse and torture.160 A number of the
litigants also challenge the legality of their prior imprisonment in
secret detention facilities operated by the Central Intelligence Agency
(“CIA”).161
While many of the cases involve novel challenges to U.S. law,
policy, or practice, others turn on evidence more than on legal
arguments. For example, many of the detainees claim that they are not
156
See Wilner, 592 F.3d at 64 (NSA and DOJ under Obama asserted Glomar
response and expressly taking position that it could neither confirm or deny
surveillance).
157
Some of these lawyers also represent clients detained in Afghanistan or
elsewhere, but I will occasionally refer to the group of lawyers as the Guantánamo
lawyers for purposes of simplicity.
158
Though neither a guardian nor a party, a “next friend” may appear in a lawsuit
on behalf a plaintiff unable to do so for himself. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 483 (3rd
Pocket ed. 2006).
159
Wilner v. National Security Agency, No. 07 Civ. 3833(DLC), 2008 WL 2567765
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). The clients of the lawyers in this sample include most of the men
whom government officials have named individually as among the most dangerous
people in the world, exactly the sort of people for whom the TSP was created. See
sources cited, supra note 144.
160
See, e.g., Complaint, Celikgogus v. Rumsfeld (D.D.C. 2007) (06-cv-1996(HHK)),
available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/CELIKGOGUS_AmendComplaint.pdf (seeking
declaratory relief and damages for prior detention and torture of multiple plaintiffs, in
violation of U.S. and international laws); Petition, Khan v. Bush, (D.D.C. 2006) (06-cv01690(RBW)), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/2006.09.28%20-Habeas%20Petition
%20-%20Majid%20Khan_Stamped.pdf. (seeking writ of habeas corpus for individual
detainee).
161
See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ¶¶ 38-61, Khan v. Gates (D.D.C. 2006)
(06-cv-01690 (RBW)), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/2006.09.28%20-Habeas%
20Petition%20-%20Majid%20Khan_Stamped.pdf.
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wartime combatants captured from battlefields but ordinary civilians,
trapped after bounty hunters kidnapped them from their homes.162
These clients need their lawyers to establish the veracity of their
stories. Other individuals maintain that they have experienced years of
physical, sexual, and psychological abuse at the hands of U.S.
officials.163 Some of these claims involve sophisticated interpretations
of precedent, but others depend primarily on access to and the
presentation of proof.
B.

Effects on Lawyers’ Communications

The threat of surveillance has prevented Guantánamo attorneys
from guaranteeing the confidentiality of their electronic
communications.164 The stories that follow demonstrate the extent to
which the threat of surveillance has hampered their ability to gather
evidence, formulate theories, and present facts and arguments to the
courts.
First and foremost, the government’s threat of electronic
surveillance has significantly impaired the lawyers’ fact-gathering.
Given the risk of electronic eavesdropping, the lawyers have been
limited in their ability to initiate or participate in telephone, e-mail,
and facsimile communications.165 The mandates of zealous advocacy
dictate that the attorney overturn every stone for information
potentially relevant to her client’s claims,166 but, as a matter of both
ethics and strategy, she cannot risk revealing confidential information
to a third party. This is particularly true where, as here, the
eavesdropper is not simply a third party whose presence could disturb
the confidentiality of the communications, but the client’s sole

162
See, e.g., Declaration of Gitanjali S. Gutierrez ¶ 24 (referencing the kidnapping
and detention of one of the Declarant’s clients) [hereinafter Gutierrez Decl.].
163
See, e.g., Complaint, Celikgogus v. Rumsfeld (D.D.C. 2007) (06-cv-1996(HHK)),
available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/CELIKGOGUS_AmendComplaint.pdf; Petition,
Khan v. Bush, (D.D.C. 2006) (06-cv-01690(RBW)), available at http://ccrjustice.org/
files/2006.09.28%20-Habeas%20Petition%20-%20Majid%20Khan_Stamped.pdf. (seeking
writ of habeas corpus for individual detainee).
164
E.g., Declaration of John A. Chandler ¶ 5, Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765
[hereinafter Chandler Decl.]; Declaration of J. Wells Dixon ¶ 20, Wilner, 2008 WL
2567765 [hereinafter Dixon Decl.]; Gutierrez Decl., supra note 162, ¶¶ 24-25; Wilner
Decl., supra note 152, ¶ 8.
165
E.g., Chandler Decl., supra note 164, ¶ 5; Declaration of Tina Monshipour
Foster ¶ 20, Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765 [hereinafter Foster Decl.].
166
See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1983); MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2002).
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adversary.167 Attorney John Chandler explains, “The defendants in my
cases are the President of the United States, the Secretary [sic] of the
Department of Defense and the commander of the base at
Guantánamo. I fear that the NSA might communicate the information
obtained to the lawyers for the respondents in my case[s].”168
The lawyers and witnesses are especially wary of government
seizure of confidential information in the Guantánamo cases, where
the potential dangers include the use of intercepted information not
simply in a formal proceeding but also in less visible, less regulated
arenas. Many of these detainees have experienced physical and
emotional abuse while in U.S. custody.169 Guards have routinely
punished detainees who sought access to counsel. Attorney Gitanjali
S. Gutierrez explains, “Detainees have been held in solitary
confinement for up to 11 days prior to a legal visit . . . ; one detainee
reported that he was told the stay in isolation was ‘the lawyer’s fault’
and could have been avoided had no legal visit been scheduled.”170
Even if the attorneys had reason to trust that the NSA would not
reveal their clients’ confidences, either to government counsel
prosecuting the cases or to guards holding the detainees in physical
custody, witnesses have been unconvinced. The threat to
confidentiality has thereby distorted the flow of information by
impairing, or in some cases fully preventing, the formation of trusting
relationships.171 After learning of the possibility of surveillance,
numerous witnesses, who might otherwise have provided relevant
factual information, ceased communications with counsel or refused
to discuss any substantive topics.172 Even putting aside the subjective
chill on speech created by the attorneys’ own concerns about
wiretapping, the globally publicized possibility of surveillance has
curtailed fact-gathering by silencing sources.
167
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6; see Charlie Cassidy & Cassandra
Porsch, Government Monitoring of Attorney-Client Communications in Terrorism-Related
Cases: Ethical Implications for Defense Attorneys, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 681, 692-94
(2004) (considering attorneys’ obligation to challenge or refuse to cooperate with
government monitoring).
168
Chandler Decl., supra note 164, ¶ 11.
169
See, e.g., Declaration of George Brent Mikum IV ¶ 17, Wilner, 2008 WL
2567765 [hereinafter Mikum Decl.] (describing controlled drowning of his client,
Zayn al-abidin Muhammad Husayn).
170
Gutierrez Decl., supra note 162, ¶ 35.
171
FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 43, at 127-28.
172
E.g., Chandler Decl., supra note 164, ¶ 5; Foster Decl., supra note 165, ¶ 20;
Gutierrez Decl., supra note 162, ¶ 24; Declaration of Brian J. Neff ¶ 26, Wilner 2008
WL 2567765. It is worth noting that fear may constrict lawyers’ and witnesses’
thinking even more narrowly than they consciously intend.
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The looming threat of surveillance has changed the attorneys’
communications both quantitatively and qualitatively — not only
blocking the flow of information, but also distorting what gets
through. Because electronic communications have become risky or
impossible, Guantánamo lawyers have searched for alternative avenues
of communication and many have resorted to in-person meetings or
mail couriers to communicate around the globe.173 These mediums of
communication have slightly expanded the set of information available
to the attorneys but have added significant burdens to the
representation of Guantánamo detainees.
Foreign travel has been expensive, time-consuming, and, in some
instances, wholly impracticable. Many individuals with information
relevant to the detainees’ cases live in Middle Eastern countries to
which flights from the United States are a luxury that neither lawyers
at nonprofit organizations, nor even well-heeled law firm partners, can
always afford.174 Some trips were made, but not with the frequency
necessary to keep clients informed and prepare cases in the manner
the attorneys considered appropriate. In some situations, foreign travel
would have risked the attorneys’ safety, because of the conditions in
the countries where witnesses or clients resided.175 In others, inperson communications were legally foreclosed. Saudi Arabia, for
example, denied the visa applications of the Center for Constitutional
Rights (“CCR”), making it effectively impossible for the attorneys
from this organization to gather evidence from their Saudi clients’
families.176
Attorneys in some instances resorted to postal communications to
supplement foreign travel. Operating without real-time
communications not only slowed the flow of information but also
seems to have impaired the attorneys’ understanding of the
information conveyed. Without clarifying or follow-up questions,
these limited communications may leave the advocate operating with
an incomplete or inaccurate set of facts.177 Miscommunications, all the
more likely across boundaries of language and culture, may be
overlooked and unresolved in the absence of back-and-forth
E.g., Dixon Decl., supra note 164, ¶ 20; Declaration of Candace Gorman ¶ 18,
Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765 [hereinafter Gorman Decl.]; Gutierrez Decl., supra note
162, ¶¶ 24-25.
174 Id.
175
E.g., Gutierrez Decl., supra note 162, ¶¶ 25, 27, 36; Declaration of Joseph
Margulies ¶ 9, Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765.
176
Gutierrez Decl., supra note 162, ¶¶ 24, 27.
177
Id. ¶ 25.
173
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dialogue.178
In addition to the obstacles imposed on fact-gathering
communications, the impediments to real-time, multi-party
communications like telephone conferences have restricted the
Guantánamo attorneys’ opportunities for collaborative dialogue with
co-counsel and experts.179 Such limits on the free formulation and
exploration of ideas may stunt the development of factual and legal
theories.180 One might argue that brainstorming about strategy with
colleagues is particularly vital for lawyers facing unprecedented legal
hurdles to their clients’ constitutional rights.
C. Effects on Court-Directed Advocacy
As described in the previous section, the threat of wiretapping has
impeded the factual and legal development in the Guantánamo cases,
but the next consideration is whether and to what extent that
impediment truly has First Amendment implications. This section
questions the extent to which the curtailment of communications
affected the ability of the lawyers to protect their clients’ individual
rights, disseminate ideas into the public marketplace, or restrict abuses
of government power.
Unfortunately, the degree and significance of the restriction is
difficult to assess. Measuring the full implications of the chilled
communications would require a hypothetical assessment of what
might have existed under circumstances that did not transpire. To
measure the communication that was stifled before reaching the
judiciary, one would need to assess the facts and witnesses never
discovered, the creative theories never developed, and the cases never
accepted.
One area that permits measurement is the passage of time. In a case
in which attorney Gitanjali S. Gutierrez represented an individual
challenging his enemy combatant status, communications with
witnesses were impeded for roughly twelve months.181 The detainee
had filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his detention as an
enemy combatant. He alleged that he was not captured in combat on
178
See Susan Bryant & Jean Koh Peters, The Five Habits of Cross Cultural
Lawyering, reprinted in RACE, CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 57-59 (Kimberly Holt
Barrett & William H. George eds., 2004).
179
Gutierrez Decl., supra note 162, ¶ 23.
180
As the Supreme Court has highlighted in its work product doctrine, the threat
of disclosure can cramp lawyers’ thinking and, therefore, their representation of their
clients. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947).
181
See Gutierrez Decl., supra note 162, ¶ 24.
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the battlefield, but rather kidnapped from his home in the middle of
the night by bounty hunters and, therefore, did not fit the definition of
an enemy combatant.182 The attorney’s communications with the firsthand witness to the kidnapping, the client’s brother, were delayed
until she was able to fly to Pakistan. Given the constitutional
significance of any of extension of time of imprisonment,183 such
interference may be interpreted to have compromised the client’s
individual rights.
Beyond any harm to the individual detainees’ cases, the open
possibility that the government has been monitoring the lawyers’
communications has threatened the attorneys’ unrelated practices.184
In large private firms, phone and fax lines may be monitored, thereby
jeopardizing the firm’s practice based on the choices of a few
associates and partners to represent Guantánamo detainees. Some of
these firms represent international clients with commercial cases
pending against the government.185 The case study did not include any
evidence of clients seeking other counsel due to the threat of
government surveillance, but this might have occurred without any
record of it. One attorney explained that because of the wholesale
threat of surveillance, she “stopped taking on new cases.”186 In these
ways, the chilling effects of the threat of surveillance have caused
some lawyers to risk loss of employment or to no longer accept
representation of Guantánamo detainees.
Government threats to the Guantánamo attorneys’ law practices
have the potential to constrict the supply of lawyers able and willing
to represent the detainees. It is worth noting that the Guantánamo
litigation does continue today; it is not the case that all such
representation has dried up. Nonetheless, because of the role of the
Guantánamo litigation in criticizing U.S. policies and practices, and
checking potential abuses of power by legislative and executive actors,
such constrictions on the flow of messages to the judiciary deserve
special attention.
V.

LESSONS OF GUANTÁNAMO FOR A THEORY OF LITIGATION AS
EXPRESSION

Drawing on the case study of Guantánamo lawyers allows us to
See id. (indicating detainee was kidnapped prior to detention).
See Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001).
184
Wilner Decl., supra note 152, ¶ 7.
185
See id. ¶ 8.
186
Gorman Decl., supra note 173, ¶ 18.
182
183
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return to the earlier Supreme Court cases with renewed appreciation
of the First Amendment significance of lawyers’ communications in
support of litigation.187 The scenario described above appears, in many
ways, to be a perfect candidate for recognition of litigation as political
expression. At the same time, the case study highlights the challenges
of recognizing any lawyer’s communications in support of litigation as
political expression.
A. Defining “Political” Litigation
The Supreme Court has historically distinguished attorney
communications that are political expression, entitled to the highest
First Amendment protection,188 from those that are only commercial
speech, entitled to intermediate scrutiny.189 Distinguishing litigation as
a form of political expression from “ordinary”190 litigation may be a
difficult exercise in line-drawing.
Five key factors emerge from Supreme Court jurisprudence as
determinative of whether litigation should be protected as political
expression: (1) whether the litigation is motivated by “political
aims”;191 (2) whether the client or potential client is a
“disenfranchised” “minority”; (3) whether the litigation advocates an
“unpopular,”192 “controversial,”193 or “dissident”194 viewpoint; (4)
whether the legal services are provided free of charge; and (5) whether
the government is an adversary. I do not mean to suggest that all five
factors are necessary for advocacy to be protected as political
The descriptions provided are based on the experiences of a relatively small
group of attorneys, and of course their own perceptions and motivations might
influence the dynamics they observe and report. Like any qualitative analysis based on
a small sample, this analysis serves not to prove with certainty any maxim about the
laws of human nature, but rather to shed light on the mechanisms of a particular
problem, this one created by governmental intrusions into attorneys’ communications.
188
Compare In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 439 (1978) (protecting solicitation as
political speech) with Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1978)
(applying lower level of review for solicitation not alleged to be political speech).
189
See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634-35 (1995) (interpreting
attorney advertisements as “pure commercial speech”). See generally Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563-65 (1980)
(identifying intermediate scrutiny test for commercial speech).
190
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 420 (1963).
191
In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 427; see Button, 371 U.S. at 429; NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
192
In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 427-28.
193
Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460.
194
Button, 371 U.S. at 431.
187
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expression, but rather each is a consideration that appears to add
weight in favor of such a determination. Drawing on the Guantánamo
example, I will briefly explore each of these factors to clarify their
meaning, purpose, and utility for developing a theory of litigation as
political expression.
1.

Political Motivation

Litigation that is motivated by political aims has been recognized by
the Court as political.195 While this seems intuitively correct,
numerous definitional questions emerge. These questions are far more
substantive than semantic.
As an initial matter, one must ask whose motivation is to be
assessed. In the NAACP cases, the Court focused on the aims of the
organization and had no occasion to distinguish those of the
individual members or their representative.196 In Primus, this
distinction became more significant because, while Edna Primus and
the ACLU had political motivations for their solicitation efforts, those
efforts were unsuccessful, and the potential client was distinctly
uninterested in the lawyers’ agenda. In Primus, the Court was focused
on the ACLU’s motivations and those of Ms. Primus.197
The notion of public interest lawyers with social justice goals of
their own, separate from the interests of their clients, has always raised
the potential for conflicts of interest.198 If the lawyer’s litigation
activities, including speech in support of litigation, serve a public role,
further consideration must be given to defining the lawyer’s duty to
the individual client. This may be more of an ethical question than a
doctrinal one, but it highlights the need for clarity regarding whose
motivations ultimately define the nature of the litigation. If there is a
conflict, allowing the lawyer’s perception to trump the client’s seems
to contradict principles of agency.199 At the same time, under the
current doctrine, if either a lawyer or a client is motivated by political
goals, that commitment should be sufficient to find the litigation
195
In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 427; see Button, 371 U.S. at 429; Patterson, 357 U.S. at
460-61.
196
See Button, 371 U.S. at 429-30; Patterson, 436 U.S. at 459-61.
197
In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 427-28.
198
See Lobel, supra note 77, at 548, 555 (describing movement lawyer’s obligation
to make strategic decisions based on goals of clients and “the political movement they
represent,” and recognizing potential conflicts between “movement” and individual
clients).
199
Lobel suggests that lawyers must follow their clients’ lead regarding the
strategic decisions, rather than following their own political “instincts.” Id.
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politically motivated.
Even more complicated than identifying the principal actor whose
motivation governs, however, is the matter of defining “political
aims.” Must the aim be to make direct social change through a judicial
decision? The NAACP and Primus decisions concerned litigation that
explicitly disseminated political messages in the form of legal claims.
Yet, as Jules Lobel argues, courts provide, in a less explicit but perhaps
even more significant way, an amplified platform for attracting public
attention for expression of dissent against government policies.200
Even when a court cannot or will not directly stay the hand of another
government actor, litigation may do so indirectly through “persistent
and persuasive appeals to the public consciousness.”201 Lobel suggests
that litigation has historically galvanized support for social movements
by lending credibility to activists’ positions and putting added pressure
on targeted parties.202 Because these less direct forms of messaging also
serve the marketplace of ideas and facilitate checks on abuses of
government power, these forms of litigation should also be considered
political.
The Supreme Court has left it unclear whether “political” litigation
includes only litigation that aims to secure broad-scale changes in the
law, or if individual cases without significant precedential weight also
reflect First Amendment values. The Court has historically recognized
the First Amendment value in constitutional litigation challenging
government policy but not in individual representation of poor people
or criminal defendants. In Button, the Court highlighted that the
NAACP did not handle what the Court labeled “ordinary damages
actions” nor represent criminal defendants without allegations of race
discrimination.203 In Velazquez, though the Court struck down the
restrictions on welfare litigation, it did not explicitly endorse a notion
of civil legal services as political.204
Id.
See Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 61, at 550 (asserting that although
marketplace of ideas does not guarantee that truth prevails, freedom of speech leaves
open theoretical possibility of rational persuasion).
202
Lobel, supra note 77, at 479-80; see id. at 486 (disputing assertions that courts
are not institutions that make effective social change); but see GERALD N. ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 33-35, 245-46 (1991).
203
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 420 (1963).
204
Interestingly, the Legal Services Corporation in Velazquez tried to make exactly
this distinction — permitting legal services lawyers to represent claimants in
individual welfare hearings yet banning federal challenges to the governing welfare
laws — and was found to violate the First Amendment. Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544 (2001).
200
201
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As the Guantánamo example helps to show, some individual
representation is political even if it appears to reflect no explicit claims
concerning large-scale social policies. The attorneys in the case study
view their role as both protecting individual rights and challenging
federal policy in the War on Terrorism.205 As attorney Clive Stafford
Smith explains, “[I]n the representation of these clients, the main
work has been to (legitimately) challenge every aspect of the secrecy
regime possible.”206 Excluding individual representation from the
definition of political litigation could exclude a case of a detainee
challenging his individual status as an enemy combatant, given that
such litigation might be based on the facts of his case — whether or
not he was not captured from a battlefield — rather than a broad
critique of U.S. policy. Yet the Guantánamo litigation has been
undertaken as part of a larger concerted effort that is indisputably
political. The line between classic public interest lawyering and
individual representation is hazier than the Supreme Court has
suggested. Motivations for litigation can change over time as facts
emerge and theories develop. As Mr. Stafford Smith attests, litigation
can also be based on dual motives from the beginning.
The Guantánamo cases illustrate the conceptual difficulties of
separating litigation to protect individual rights from that aimed at
larger social change.207 Many “ordinary” public defenders208 and civil
legal services attorneys209 view their work as inherently political and
205
See, e.g., Declaration of Michael Sternhell ¶ 16, Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, No.
07 Civ. 3833(DLC), 2008 WL 2567765 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“I consider it an honor and
privilege to represent innocent men who have been denied due process and the
opportunity to prove their innocence before a court of law. And I consider it my duty
as a lawyer to contest my government’s efforts to violate the Constitution . . . in its
extralegal detention of my clients and other prisoners at Guantánamo . . . .”).
206
Declaration of Clive A. Stafford Smith, ¶ 22, Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765; see also,
e.g., Dixon Decl., supra note 164, ¶ 29 (“I believe that ensuring basic due process
rights for anyone detained by the Executive Branch is consistent with traditional
principles of American justice and the highest standards of our legal system.”); Mikum
Decl., supra note 169, ¶ 21 (“It is important that I be allowed to represent my client
. . . who is falsely accused and wrongfully tortured.”).
207
See Thomas M. Hilbink, You Know the Type: Categories of Cause Lawyering, 29
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 657, 662-90 (2004) (dividing cause lawyers into proceduralist,
elite/vanguard, and grassroots).
208
Smith, supra note 46, at 953 (describing criminal defense activity as
participation in larger movement for social change).
209
See, e.g., SOUTH BROOKLYN LEGAL SERVICES, http://www.sbls.org (last visited Apr.
1, 2011) (“The mission of South Brooklyn Legal Services is to seek equal justice for
low-income people in Brooklyn by providing a broad range of legal advocacy and
information, helping empower poor people to identify and defeat the causes and
effects of poverty in their communities.”).
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social justice–oriented.210 All of these categories of litigation may be
political,211 and the distinction between “political” lawyering and
“ordinary” lawyering may be unworkable.212
Given this context, courts assessing the accuracy and veracity of a
party’s claims of “political aims” are in a difficult situation. Trying to
puzzle through the philosophical meaning of “political” is no answer.
This is partly because judges are not philosophy experts, but also
because the doctrinal inquiry has a different purpose: isolating that
category of activity that society has chosen to protect, perhaps largely
for instrumentalist reasons. One might suggest the following
approach: if the lawyer represents that the litigation has political aims,
her assertion should resolve this prong of the inquiry.213 While this
may seem overly deferential to the party claiming a First Amendment
interest, erring in the other direction takes us back into the morass of
unwise and unworkable inquiries.214 Admittedly, in theory, any
attorney could make a bald assertion of political motivation, but
hopefully consideration of other factors, discussed below, will
decrease the frequency of such occurrences.
As a final note on distinguishing when litigation is motivated by
210
See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS,
PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING 94-95 (2004) (identifying cause lawyers
focused on empowering individual clients).
211
The deeper meaning of “political litigation” is beyond the scope of this article.
All litigation is political in that it concerns the ordering of social relations. See id.
(broadly defining cause lawyering to include widely varying forms “directed at
altering some aspect of the social, economic, and political status quo”). Just as an
example, an “ordinary” welfare case or landlord-tenant dispute concerns the
redistribution of wealth and property. See Tarkington, supra note 69, at 388 &
nn.157-58. Nonetheless, it may be that certain forms of litigation have a more direct
connection to political speech than others and, where the connection is too tenuous,
we may not extend the same protection.
212
See Stuart A. Scheingold & Anne Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering:
Practice Sites and the Politicization of the Professional, 5 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 209, 22936 (1998).
213
With the exception of Velazquez, which was not overtly political, the litigationas-expression cases have highlighted the attorneys’ demonstrated political ideologies,
pointing to their affiliations and past litigation activities. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412, 414-15 & n.1-2 (1978) (describing Ms. Primus’ affiliation with ACLU,
ACLU’s history, and organization’s stated mission); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
419-22 & n.5 (1963) (describing history and structure of NAACP and NAACP LDF).
A full-blown evidentiary examination of the attorneys’ motivations could become an
unwieldy sideshow and obstacle to litigation, but an affirmation of one’s political
intent seems a reasonable requirement.
214
For a discussion of the unworkability of recognizing any litigation as political
expression, see Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S.
620, 642-43 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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political aims, one difference that may be observed between the
litigation-as-political-expression precedent and the Guantánamo
example is that, in the former set of cases, to determine the motivation
behind the litigation, the Court referenced the past activities of the
organization with which the attorney was associated,215 but many of
the Guantánamo attorneys are private counsel associated with no
political organization.216 It seems a matter of common sense that an
attorney can engage in litigation for political purposes even if not a
member of a traditional political organization.217 Further, society is
best served if courts protect these private lawyers, so that they are able
to provide pro bono representation to clients who might otherwise be
unrepresented. The rationale behind recognizing litigation as political
expression is not based on the intrinsic, pre-political rights of the
lawyers but the effects on the marketplace of ideas and promotion of
self-government by the people. With these principles in mind, the
speech of private, unassociated attorneys should be treated no
differently from that of their nonprofit colleagues.
2.

Minority Client or Potential Client

The second factor the Court has emphasized is whether the litigants
are part of a minority segment of society for whom litigation may be
the most effective, or only, form of political expression.218 This

215
See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 414-15 & n.1-2; Button, 371 U.S. at 419-22 &
n.5. A full-blown evidentiary examination of the attorneys’ motivations could become
an unwieldy sideshow and obstacle to litigation, but an affirmation of one’s political
intent seems a reasonable requirement.
216
The Supreme Court has previously recognized as a right of association the right
of a union to disseminate legal information, make referrals to attorneys, collectively
hire counsel, or negotiate fee agreements for individual members, even where,
arguably, the litigation did not have a political aim. See generally United Mineworkers
v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (worker’s compensation); Bhd. of R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S 1 (1964) (personal injury claims against employer). I
would suggest that, in these cases, the Court recognized the activity as protected
because it concerned federal statutes regulating the social relationship between unions
and management. One might argue that the union is necessarily a political
organization, for which the rule should be different than for an attorney or other
individual not associated with a political organization. Along these lines, one might
suggest that, for the speech of a lawyer not associated with a political organization to
be given the highest level of First Amendment protection, the litigation must be aimed
at disseminating a political message. The problem of course becomes defining that
category of litigation.
217
See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 210, at 74.
218
See Button, 371 U.S. at 431.
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emphasis reflects political process theory,219 under which judicial
scrutiny will expand to protect “discrete and insular minorities”220 that
cannot fairly compete in the political process.221 Under this view,
because the political process is controlled by majoritarian forces, full
access for minorities requires the judiciary to ensure that the majority
does not use its position to disadvantage a minority based on hostility
or prejudice, and also, the courts take on a special role in clearing
blocked channels of political change.222
The litigation-as-expression cases reflect the values of process
theory. In protecting court-directed expression, the Court was
interested not so much in resolving the individual grievances of the
parties but in facilitating minority contributions to public dialogue.
This may be interpreted as promoting those individuals’ and groups’
right to participate equally in self-government223 as well as upending
targeted obstacles to political change.224 To the extent that one values
the substantive outcomes as well, it may also be explained as actively
facilitating public discourse or correcting for failures in the
marketplace of ideas, so that diverse ideas have the amplification they
need to reach the public and get vetted.225
Recognizing litigation as a form of political power over which
lawyers have a monopoly, and appreciating the barriers minorities face
in accessing other levers of power, the Court has protected litigation
to support those lawyers who make the societal contribution of
ensuring that minority voices can be heard. Combining this
jurisprudence with the Court’s insight in Velazquez that protecting
attorneys’ advocacy supports the court’s role in maintaining the
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75
(1980).
220
United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
221
See Tsai, supra note 56, at 871-72 nn.185-87. But see ROSENBERG, supra note
202, at 10-21, 30-36 (disputing that courts are institutions of social change); Jules
Lobel, The Political Tilt of the Separation of Powers, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 591, 608
(David Kairys ed., 1998) (suggesting that separation of powers prevents radical
change, though it can prevent abuses of power).
222
Luke P. McLaughlin, The Elysian Foundations of Election Law, 82 TEMP. L. REV.
89, 99 (2009).
223
Lobel, supra note 221, at 608 (describing litigation as “expand[ing] the points
of access to government,” which may be especially important when one branch
overreaches).
224
See McLaughlin, supra note 222, at 99.
225
See generally Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process
Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747 (1991) (comparing process theory with notion that
substantive values justify judiciary’s role in overturning democratically expressed will
of people).
219

2011]

Towards an Understanding of Litigation as Expression

1529

balance of government powers suggests that protecting attorneys’
advocacy on behalf of minorities has particular value, and government
intrusions on it should receive particular scrutiny. In this way, factor
two mirrors factor five, discussed below, which supports checks on
abuses of government power.
An obvious question that remains is how to define the minorities
who receive special protection. One could draw upon equal protection
jurisprudence and rely on the accepted categories of suspect classes or
discrete and insular minorities,226 but, if protecting access to courts is
designed to correct imbalances in the democratic process, there is a
fatal flaw in the solution of focusing on such groups. The Achilles’
heel of First Amendment theory and justifications for the adversary
system is that the poor are generally not recognized within the
category of persons in need of protection.227 Yet, one might argue that
the poor are far less powerful than any other social group.228
Turning to the example of Guantánamo highlights this
contradiction. James Forman argues that some of the detention tactics
used in the War on Terrorism are strikingly similar to everyday
practices of the American criminal justice system, and the detainees
are receiving far better representation.229 Without undercutting the
importance of the work, or the undeniably grueling conditions, it
must be admitted that representation of Guantánamo detainees,
though once a radical project of CCR, has now attracted significant
numbers of high-profile lawyers who see these cases as high stakes
litigation. One might argue that, in spite of all the evidence of the
chilling effects of surveillance, there is no shortage of detainee
lawyers. In contrast, due to funding constraints that leave poor
people’s lawyers with enormous caseloads, the “process” most poor
226
See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (ruling that “aliens”
are “prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority” warranting “heightened
judicial solicitude,” and striking down laws conditioning welfare benefits on
citizenship).
227
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-29 (1973)
(refusing to recognize poor as suspect class).
228
Although the poor have generally not been recognized as a suspect class or a
discrete and insular minority in the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence,
one could argue that the poor have been recognized as such, albeit indirectly, in the
litigation-as-expression context. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533,
535 (2001) (ruling that restriction on speech of poor people’s lawyers violated First
Amendment, in part because of lack of alternative channels for communication); In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 415-16 (1978) (protecting solicitation as political speech, where
lawyer sought to represent poor women sterilized as condition of receiving Medicaid).
229
James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make the
War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 348-59 (2009).
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Americans receive in “ordinary” criminal cases is so limited by time as
to be meaningless.230 Further, poor people at risk of losing their
homes, jobs, and other basics of economic survival are not entitled to
lawyers, and, unlike the Guantánamo detainees whose cases appeal to
high-profile volunteers, “ordinary” poor people are expected to
negotiate the adversary system without representation.231
Ultimately, assessing and defining the client’s minority status as an
indicator of whether litigation should be protected as political
expression depends on the First Amendment value one prioritizes:
deliberative process or improving the quality of self-government. If
providing a forum for participation by all citizens (and perhaps
correcting for failures in the marketplace of ideas) is crucial, then
litigation on behalf of minorities or otherwise disenfranchised persons
should receive special attention. Defining this category will then
require further exploration. If, however, like Professor Blasi, one puts
a premium on the checking value in the First Amendment, then
protecting the vulnerable may be less important than protecting those
in the best position to block governmental abuses of power. For Blasi,
elites play a special role in the First Amendment. He believes that all
citizens’ abilities to understand and combat government power depend
on the intellectual and financial resources of professional critics.232
Blasi identifies journalists in particular as such critics, but lawyers
would also fit that role. Even under Blasi’s checking approach,
however, it may be important to protect litigation on behalf of
minorities, if one believes those persons are the most likely to be the
subjects of government abuses of power. They may also be the people
most likely to lodge radical critiques of it.
3.

Dissident or Unpopular Viewpoint

Supreme Court precedent has given some support to the checking
theory, particularly in decisions that have protected litigation that
advanced a dissident or unpopular viewpoint.233 The Primus Court did
not consider the status of women or poor people as a disenfranchised
class, nor did it address explicitly the controversial nature of forced
sterilization, but it protected solicitation efforts towards such persons,
230

Id. at 364-66.

Id.
Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 61, at 541-42.
233
See In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 428 (emphasizing ACLU’s role in protecting
“unpopular causes” and “political dissent”); see also Blasi, Checking Value, supra note
61, at 527 (prioritizing opposition to governmental abuses of power as key purpose of
First Amendment).
231
232
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as a form of political expression, based on the importance of
advocating on behalf of “unpopular causes and [persons].”234 The
Court generally has not distinguished unpopular or dissident
viewpoints from unpopular or minority clients, but the categories ought
to be examined separately because they reflect different emphases with
respect to First Amendment theory.235 It depends whether the primary
purpose is to protect the speaker’s autonomy and right of participation
or the dissemination of information to the community of listeners to
enable good government. Protecting the unpopular client follows
process theory in that it aims to increase disenfranchised citizens’
access to the deliberative process. Protecting viewpoints, however,
particularly dissident viewpoints, may be more significant for
improving the quality of the democratic government, and, in
particular, safeguarding the checking function of the people.
Jules Lobel argues that protecting unpopular, dissident viewpoints
carries distinct value because of the role that courts can play in
providing opportunities for the expression of dissent when other
avenues are less potent.236 He suggests that the early Guantánamo
litigation proved to be a key method of drawing public attention to
previously neglected aspects of U.S. policy.237 This litigation helped to
attract media and galvanize a small social movement. While
knowledge and criticism of U.S. detention policies in Guantánamo
may seem common now, when CCR first began this litigation, these
lawyers were advancing a minority view.238 Perhaps, where
representation falls into both categories — vulnerable clients and
dissident viewpoints — it raises an additional red flag to protect the
litigation as expression.239
4.

Services Provided Free of Charge

A key feature of the litigation-as-expression cases has been the
In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 427-28.
An unpopular, dissident viewpoint could theoretically be advanced on behalf of
a politically powerful client. As just one example of the distinction, if Philip Morris
advocated an end to smoking bans, that position would face stiff political opposition,
though the corporation enjoys financial resources that would allow it to reach
multiple avenues to disseminate its views.
236
Lobel, supra note 77, at 479-80.
237
Id. at 489, 556-60.
238
See id. at 560.
239
Primus particularly highlighted the importance of litigation at the nexus
between unpopular viewpoints and disenfranchised clients. See In re Primus, 436 U.S.
at 427-28.
234
235
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Court’s emphasis on the lawyers’ pursuit of political as opposed to
remunerative aims. Before concluding that the solicitation in Primus
constituted political expression entitled to the highest level of First
Amendment protection, the Court spent considerable time discussing
the fee agreement between the ACLU and cooperating attorneys,
highlighting that the case was not one where the income of the
attorney engaged in solicitation depended on the outcome of the
litigation.240 In contrast, the same day as it decided Primus, the Court
issued an opinion in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, in which it held
that “[i]n person solicitation by a lawyer of remunerative employment
is a business transaction,” and a ban on such activity warrants only
intermediate scrutiny.241 This pair of cases suggests that only unpaid
litigation, and speech in support thereof, can count as political
expression.
Some members of the Court have argued that earning one’s living is
not necessarily mutually exclusive from pursuing politically expressive
aims through one’s work. Some have suggested that the mythological
divide between professionalism and remuneration is largely an artifact
based in discrimination against certain classes of lawyers and is
divorced from “the real-life fact that lawyers earn their livelihood at
the bar.”242 Even attorneys employed by political organizations are
paid; in most cases, the check simply comes from a grant instead of a
client. Importantly, if there were no finances supporting political
litigation, it simply could not be sustained.243 In the Guantánamo
example, one of the difficulties the private pro bono counsel face is
that the wiretapping has threatened their economic viability by
interfering with the representation not only of the Guantánamo
detainees but also of their paying clients.
In spite of these pragmatic observations, if a primary purpose
behind recognizing speech in support of litigation is to keep open a
Id. at 436 n.30.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978).
242
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977). In particular, fee-shifting
statutes encourage private attorneys general to support the enforcement of laws with
strong public policy rationales, and many consider such litigation to be classic public
interest litigation. See David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on
Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 241-44 (2003) [hereinafter
Taking Out the Adversary]; Tsai, supra note 56, at 889-95.
243
See Laura K. Abel & David S. Udell, If You Gag the Lawyers, Do You Choke the
Courts? Some Implications for Judges When Funding Restrictions Curb Advocacy by
Lawyers on Behalf of the Poor, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 873, 881 (2002); David C.
Vladeck, In re Arons: The Plight of the “Unrich” in Obtaining Legal Services, in LEGAL
ETHICS STORIES 255, 261, 284-86 (Deborah L. Rhode & David J. Luban eds., 2006).
240
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channel of communication uniquely available to disenfranchised
persons, this justification may be strongest where the legal services are
offered free of charge. As Deborah Rhode has pointed out,
rationalizations for the lawyer’s role as a zealous advocate may lose
value when partisans are allocated by the market.244 Adding special
protection for those providing free services may compensate
somewhat for market forces and help to ensure a wider range of views
than those the marketplace otherwise would provide in court and
elsewhere. The absence of a pecuniary incentive might also help to
reveal whether the motivation of the lawyer is truly political and to
exclude solicitation from heightened protection where, as in Ohralik,
the speech coerces a vulnerable client to agree to representation.245
Admittedly, there may be overzealous public interest attorneys who,
with political motives rather than financial ones, still have difficulty
accepting “no” as an answer from a potential client. Yet, hopefully, the
financial factor should filter out a subset of the most egregious cases.
Though implementing this factor may become challenging, democratic
values provide attractive reasons to take into account whether the
client pays for the adversary work.246
5.

Government Adversary

Finally, although not always highlighted by the Court, the litigationas-political-expression cases have been grounded, at least implicitly, in
struggles against legislative or executive power.247 This may be with
good reason. The functioning of the system of checks and balances
requires safeguarding the ability of the judiciary to check any excesses
by the other branches and, arguably, safeguarding lawyers’ ability to
play their supporting role.248 When litigation aims to bring to the
judiciary complaints regarding the actions of other government actors,
efforts by those actors to block the litigation necessarily raise
Rhode, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 48, at 611-12.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 461.
246
Another possibility, somewhat more nuanced that the Court’s dichotomy
between paid and unpaid litigation, might expand the category of highly protected
litigation to include services offered at a significantly below-market rate, on the basis
that they compensate for failures in the marketplace, or where legal services are
compensated under a fee-shifting statute designed to sustain litigation that will correct
social ills. See Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990’s: The Dichotomy
Between Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 208-09 (1997) (describing
legislative intent behind fee-shifting provisions).
247
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
248
See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001).
244
245
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significant questions with respect to the functioning of the balance of
powers.249 As a simple matter of logic, if legislative or executive actors
can constrict criticisms of their actions, they can directly impede not
only the marketplace of ideas but also the process of self-government
by the people.
Vincent Blasi has emphasized that the abuse of power by a
government actor brings special dangers,250 and the Guantánamo case
study provides dramatic examples of this phenomenon. The
government is not an “ordinary” adversary but rather one with
extraordinary power over the individual litigant and society as a
whole. The government has an unparalleled breadth of coercive tools
at its disposal.
As described above, the implementation of the Terrorist Surveillance
Program, and announcements describing its broad contours, have
reached large swaths of society, both within the United States and
across borders. The executive and legislative branches of the U.S.
government have also taken steps beyond wiretapping, which constrict
the ability of counsel to consult with and obtain evidence on behalf of
the detainees.251 U.S. officials have blocked in-person attorney-client
communications. As David Luban documented in Lawfare and Legal
Ethics in Guantánamo, guards have misrepresented to attorneys that
clients were uninterested in communicating with counsel, and have
sown mistrust between detainees and lawyers by disparaging the
attorneys to their clients and telling the detainees that the attorneys
are government interrogators.252 In 2007, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Detainee Affairs condemned the Guantánamo lawyers on
National Public Radio and suggested that corporate clients should
boycott their law firms.253 The Deputy had scripted portions of his
See id.
Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 61, at 538-39.
251
See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008) (ruling that Congress
overstepped in Military Commissions Act, which deprived federal courts of
jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions for alleged enemy combatants).
252
J. Wells Dixon reports guards at Guantánamo “routinely informed my clients
that they have ‘reservations’ — i.e., interrogations [by government agents] — when
they are actually scheduled to meet with me . . . [and on another occasion,] a military
officer lied to me directly about a client’s willingness to meet with me.” Dixon Decl.,
supra note 164, ¶ 28. The latter occurred while his client’s case was pending before the
Supreme Court. id.; see also Luban, Guantánamo, supra note 146, at 1990-91.
253
Interview by Jane Norris with Deputy Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Detainee Affairs
Charles Stimson (National Public Radio broadcast Jan. 11, 2007) (partial transcript
available at http://www.democracynow.org/2007/1/17/top_pentagon_official_calls_
for_boycott) (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs Charles
Stimson announced, “[W]hen corporate CEOs see that [the major law] firms are
249
250
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radio announcement in advance, and it reflected the government’s
position at that time.254
The legislature has also taken actions that have limited detainees’
access to lawyers and courts. In a “material support” statute that
criminalizes activities in support of terrorist organizations, Congress
included the provision of legal expertise within the definition of
material support and, thereby, cut off certain groups’ access to
lawyers.255 Congress also directly undercut the power of the judiciary
by passing legislation that stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over
habeas corpus petitions for alleged enemy combatants.256 Questions
about the government’s intent are beyond the scope of this Article;
however, examining only the effects, the confluence of these
government actions appears to interfere with access to counsel and
courts in a manner that is not only quantitatively, but also
qualitatively, different than interference that a private actor could
engender.
The power of government actors is due, at least in part, to their
ability to exert legitimized force.257 Beyond the violence imposed on
the battlefield, the U.S. government has imprisoned hundreds of men
and deprived them of access to the outside world. In many cases, U.S.
agents’ ability to thwart attorney-client communications resulted from
the agents’ physical custody of those clients.258 Agents further
exploited their position of physical control over the clients by
subjecting them to physical, sexual, and emotional abuse.259 At the
same time, the power of the U.S. government to designate the location
of these prison sites protected the apparent legitimacy of the force
exerted, at least temporarily. Those sites include not only
Guantánamo, arguably selected to escape judicial scrutiny,260 but also
representing the very terrorists who hit their bottom line back in 2001, those CEOs
are going to make those law firms choose between representing terrorists or
representing reputable firms . . . .”).
254
Luban, Guantánamo, supra note 146, at 1981-83 (citation omitted).
255
18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b)(1) (West 2010); id. § 2339B(a)(1). Of course courts
sometimes sanction the legislature’s actions. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010) (upholding statute).
256
See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764 (striking statute).
257
Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 61, at 538-39.
258
See Luban, Guantánamo, supra note 146, at 1989-92.
259
See Report on Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment of Prisoners at Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (July 2006), available at http://ccrjustice.org/
files/Report_ReportOnTorture.pdf (summarizing abuse of detainees).
260
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480-81 (2004) (ruling that court had jurisdiction
to hear habeas petition of detainee, contrary to position of Executive Branch).
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scattered CIA outposts intentionally shielded from public view.261
While these theories of government power are compelling, one
might find the Guantánamo case study proves too much. The
dichotomy between governmental and nongovernmental actors is an
attractive categorical system, due in part to its apparent easy
application,262 in contrast to that of the other factors described above;
however, the rationale for the distinction is not completely firm. Many
cases of litigation against government actors do not involve such dire
or coercive circumstances for the nongovernmental party. In theory, a
government always has the power to resort to the use of force, but to
give speech in support of litigation against government actors special
recognition, further attention would need to be paid as to how remote
a possibility of force would be sufficient to trigger the protection.
Additionally, while governmental powers of intrusion and control can
reach broadly, this does not make them distinct from those of private
actors. The government does not have a monopoly on systematic
power. As a concrete example, in the wiretapping case, the U.S.
government relied on private telephone companies to conduct the
surveillance.263
B.

Defining the Communications Protected

The five factors described above highlight the key considerations
reflected in Supreme Court jurisprudence on litigation as political
expression, as well as a few of the many inherent challenges of such
analysis. In addition to identifying the distinguishing features of
“political” litigation, developing a theory of attorneys’
communications in support of litigation as expression will require
coming to terms with the scope of the communications to be included.
The Guantánamo example is an atypical example of litigation as
political expression that does not fit squarely within the model of
Button-Primus-Velazquez. This section draws attention to three areas in
which it differs, as they offer three final lessons about the definition of
litigation as a form of political expression.
First, one must consider whether fact-gathering communications
See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 161.
For purposes of this Article, I have not considered whether litigation on behalf
of a government entity should be protected as political expression. For an interesting
examination of government lawyers as cause lawyers, see Steven K. Berenson,
Government Lawyer as Cause Lawyer: A Study of Three High Profile Lawsuits, 86 DENV.
U. L. REV. 457, 480-93 (2009).
263
See, e.g., Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 992-93 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(describing AT&T Corporation’s role in government wiretapping).
261
262
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should be protected as political speech. Button and Primus concerned
solicitation laws that jeopardized attorneys’ access to potential clients,
whereas the announced threat of surveillance jeopardizes the
Guantánamo attorneys’ later communications with clients and other
sources of information. The exchange of factual information is
different from discussions of political ideas,264 and one might argue
that Button and Primus are better cases for recognition of the
communication as political speech because they concerned direct
regulation of speech advocating “vindicat[ion of] legal rights” by the
listener.265
Yet fact-gathering communications are no less essential than
solicitation. If the lawyer can only agree to represent clients, but
cannot conduct any related fact-gathering or theory development, the
right to litigate becomes close to useless.266 Solicitation occurs first in
time so the litigation can go forward, but discussing the possibility of
representation is no more fundamental to the case than factual
investigation. Imagine if Ms. Primus could solicit clients, but then the
ACLU lawyers were statutorily barred from communicating with the
group to learn whether they had been sterilized or whether they
received Medicaid assistance. Without the facts, the lawyer could not
draft a complaint, let alone prepare the case for trial.267
Focusing on the solicitation as the protected speech is too narrow a
reading of the earlier cases. The political expression is the courtdirected speech, and the solicitation is simply an extension of it, a
recognized prerequisite, protected because otherwise the recognition
of litigation as protected speech would be hollow. The real problem
with the anti-solicitation law in Button was not simply that it blocked
the discussion of desegregation, but that it interfered with the
NAACP’s access to clients needed to challenge desegregation in court.
The Supreme Court described as the “gravest danger . . . smothering

264
But see Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 61, at 603, 610 (highlighting
constitutional significance of accessing information).
265
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 437 (1963). Comparing the NAACP member
to the union member who urges others to utilize federal labor laws and join his union,
the Court in Button held that encouraging potential plaintiffs to retain the NAACP to
pursue litigation challenging school desegregation a protected form of advocacy to
persuade others to vindicate their legal rights. “Free trade in ideas means free trade in
the opportunity to persuade to action . . . .” Id. (quotation omitted).
266
See Luban, Taking Out the Adversary, supra note 242, at 245 (describing how
mechanisms that cripple one side turn adversary system into “farce”).
267
See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547 (2001) (describing First
Amendment right to advise clients of claims and bring those claims to judiciary).
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all discussion looking to the eventual institution of litigation on behalf
of the rights of members of an unpopular minority.”268
The Court has held that solicitation was protected because of its
relationship to litigation aimed at promoting beliefs and ideas.269 In
contrast, the same day as it released the Primus opinion, the Court
issued Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n,270 which recognized no First
Amendment interest in solicitation where the litigation had no
political motive and the attorney sought only pecuniary gain.
Particularly given the strong language in both Button and Primus
regarding the significance of litigation as a form of political expression
on behalf of dissident clients and causes, the states’ regulation of
solicitation in those cases is best understood as an indirect yet
unconstitutional burden on the more highly protected expressive
activity of courtroom advocacy.
One might argue that the Supreme Court has previously refused to
recognize chilling effects on the gathering of information.271 Yet the
Court in those cases did not credit the factual assertions of chilling
effects.272 Additionally, that precedent involved journalists and, while
it is undeniable that journalists play a significant role in American
democracy,273 it is not outside the realm of possibility that the Court
would make a different rule for lawyers. In Velazquez, the Court
emphasized that lawyers have a unique role in supporting the
functioning of the courts.274
This still leaves the question of which fact-gathering activities
should be included within the scope of political expression. The
Button, 371 U.S. at 434.
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 (1978).
270
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978).
271
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978) (noting skepticism about
chilling effects and risks to journalist’s sources as result of search of newsroom);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1972) (“[W]e remain unclear how often and
to what extent informers are actually deterred from furnishing information when
newsmen are forced to testify . . . .”); see Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 61, at 602.
272
See. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 566; Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693; see Blasi, Checking
Value, supra note 61, at 602.
273
One of the major obstacles to granting extended protections to journalists is the
difficulty of defining this category of persons. Any individual who created a blog on
the internet could arguably claim First Amendment protection as a journalist.
Lawyers, on the other hand, are more easily identified, and more easily held
accountable for their actions, because they cannot practice without governmentapproved licenses.
274
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001). Justice Scalia accuses
the majority of demonstrating “improper special solicitude for our own profession.”
Id. at 562; see also Barton, supra note 28, at 455 n.4.
268
269
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communications at issue in the Guantánamo case study were primarily
between lawyers and third parties, not lawyers and clients. While the
information third parties provide may be just as important to the
development of a case, stretching the constitutional protection this
broadly potentially extends the First Amendment protection even
beyond the scope of the attorney-client privilege. Even defining the
attorney-client privilege as a First Amendment right could create
challenges for existing restrictions on it. To go beyond the privilege
seems almost backwards.
Yet the concept of recognizing a category of communications
exceeding the scope of attorney-client privilege is not unprecedented;
it is reflected in lawyers’ confidentiality obligation. Beyond evidentiary
and procedural protections, clients also enjoy reassurance of privacy
provided by rules of ethics that, with the notable crime-fraud
exception,275 prohibit the lawyer’s release of information acquired in
the course of representing a client. Confidentiality obligations protect
a broad scope of information; they apply whenever the lawyer is acting
in the course of representation. This includes not only
communications with a client but information gained from any source.
It even pertains to facts learned accidentally or through observation
rather than communication, so long as the lawyer is acting in the
course of representation at the time of discovering the relevant
information.276 While the lawyer’s ethical obligation of confidentiality
is based on agency principles277 and therefore may be tied less closely
to the adversary system than are the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine, this definition of the confidentiality obligation
arguably shares the values of that system. It reflects a similarly holistic
conception of the lawyer’s role and recognizes a critical distinction
between the lawyer functioning as an advocate and the lawyer
functioning as a regular citizen.
Further consideration should be given to the implications of
recognizing these broad categories of fact-gathering communications
as protected. Although it does potentially constitutionalize a tidal
wave of activity, the Supreme Court has already laid the groundwork.
275
In the aftermath of the Enron scandals, this area has been an area of some
movement and controversy. See, e.g., Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big
Quake: The Conceptual Fault Line in the Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 1 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 335, 339-61 (2008) (describing Enron scandal and subsequent
alterations of lawyers’ confidentiality obligations).
276
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. (1983).
277
L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer’s Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J.
909, 941-42 (1980).
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In Primus,278 the Court cited Thomas Emerson’s article on
associational expression279 to describe the relationship between
litigation and out-of-court speech essential to it. Emerson explains
that the concept of freedom of association, invented by the Alabama
Court, is better understood as derivative of the freedom of expression
than as an independent right.280 Associational conduct, Emerson
explains, can amplify and even qualitatively alter expression, and for
this reason, he maintained that all associational activities intended to
spread messages farther or more effectively ought to be protected
based on their expressive purpose.281 He includes conduct like renting
a concert hall, purchasing supplies, and purchasing sound equipment
as forms of expressive association, which, although not literally
speech, should be protected as such.282 Under Emerson’s theory, the
constitutional problem in the Alabama-Button-Primus trio was that the
government had infringed on activities necessary to realizing effective
advocacy.
Emerson’s approach significantly widens the scope of protection. It
could potentially lead to a First Amendment right to attorney-client
privilege, to taking depositions, and to renting a law office. While
extending the protection to conduct may go too far, the rationale is
compelling and apparently interested the Primus Court.283 Even if
extending the protection to conduct seems tenuous, Emerson’s
perspective supports the notion of broadly protecting speech in
support of litigation as political expression.
There remains one final question raised by the Guantánamo case
study. Even if communications with witnesses were recognized as
protected speech, the burden on that speech is indirect. Incidental
burdens on free expression are generally tolerated because of the
breadth of government activities that would otherwise be subject to
review.284 Particularly given the potential floodgates described above
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 n.32 (1978).
Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE
L.J. 1, 26 (1964).
280
Id. at 1-2.
281
Id. at 22.
282
Id. at 25.
283
In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 438 n.32.
284
Some scholars have argued that incidental burdens should receive lesser
scrutiny, if any, because of the practical impossibly of enacting government regulation
that creates no incidental burdens. For a thoughtful defense of the constitutional
relevance of incidental burdens, see Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on
Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1194-98 (1996). See also Cole, supra note
8, at 7 (arguing that guilt-by-association statutes have chilling effect similar to direct
278
279
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in defining the factual investigations protected, it is tempting to omit
consideration of incidental burdens.
The Supreme Court has recognized incidental burdens on litigation
in prior cases. Both Velazquez and Alabama may be interpreted as
cases of indirect burdens on expressive activities of litigation. In
Velazquez, Congress funded only lawyers who refrained from litigating
particular claims challenging welfare laws or, in other words,
representing clients whose cases presented those claims.285 Regulations
restricted LSC counsel directly, but private attorneys were free to
pursue such cases, and LSC recipients were free to cease accepting
LSC funds.286 As a practical matter, however, the funding restriction
threatened the viability of expression challenging welfare laws, and,
for this reason, the Supreme Court ruled that the funding restriction
violated the First Amendment.
Alabama presents an even more removed relationship between
government action and a burden on expressive activity.287 The
Alabama Court determined that the public revelation of NAACP
members’ and agents’ identities risked exposing them to physical and
economic harms by other private citizens and, therefore, the state
court’s disclosure order constituted “unconstitutional intimidation of
the free exercise of the right to advocate.”288 To reach this conclusion,
the Court inferred from past acts of reprisal imposed on other
individuals that future acts would be visited upon current members
and agents; that, based on knowledge of those acts, African-Americans
would be discouraged from participating in the NAACP in the future;
and that the organization’s ability to disseminate its political message
would thereby be diminished.289 I make no objection to these
inferences of logic, but the number of them is worth noting. The
Court’s willingness to recognize the realities facing the NAACP
underscores the Court’s concern with providing robust protection for
advocates of political litigation.
The Court’s willingness to recognize a broad category of
communications in support of litigation as entitled to First
Amendment protection as political expression is for good reason.
Incidental restrictions with a disproportionate burden on protected
First Amendment activities, such as an ink tax, will trigger First
censorship of subversive speech).
285
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536-37 (2001).
286
Id. at 546-47.
287
See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958).
288
Id. at 461-63.
289

Id.
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Amendment scrutiny.290 How far the incidental burdens analysis
should extend is beyond the scope of this Article, but the wiretapping
of lawyers under the TSP, a program which did have a
disproportionate impact on First Amendment activity, reminds us of
the importance of the interests at stake. While the scope of protection
ought not to extend indefinitely, given the long history of
governments indirectly burdening activity they cannot ban outright,
recognizing broadly defined incidental burdens may be necessary to
protect First Amendment freedoms.291
CONCLUSIONS
As of the date of this publication, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals just handed down a decision allowing a group of lawyers,
journalists, and others potentially wiretapped under the recent
amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendment Act
to challenge the constitutionality of such surveillance.292 Following the
Second Circuit’s ruling that the plaintiffs have standing to proceed, the
lower court must now face the merits of the claims. This case raises
First Amendment questions that, up until now in the War on
Terrorism, courts have avoided.
The dangers of national security challenge us to grapple seriously
with the degree of protection we want to accord lawyers’
communications in support of their adversary work. This inquiry
ought to reflect the structure of the American adversary system and its
philosophical underpinnings. I maintain that the court system and
lawyers’ work within it promote the same basic values undergirding
our freedom of speech jurisprudence: individual liberty, the
marketplace of ideas, and, in particular, self-government. The degree
of protection we choose to grant to lawyers’ communications reflects
our commitment to core First Amendment values.
A line of Supreme Court cases dating back half a century provides
precedent for defining litigation as political expression, entitled to the
highest level of First Amendment protection. The more recent
decision of Velazquez underscores the special expressive role of the
lawyer in the adversary system. The governmental interest in Button
and Primus was insubstantial if not illegitimate and Velazquez, while in
See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 591 (1983).
291
See sources cited and explanatory parentheticals supra note 271.
292
Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, No. 09-4112-cv, 2011 WL 941524, at *25 (2d
Cir. Mar. 20, 2011).
290
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some ways moving the jurisprudence forward, never explicitly
embraced the notion of litigation as political. These cases therefore left
questions about the strength and breadth of protection for litigation as
expression.
To explore the contours of the protection for litigation in the face of
a countervailing government interest more substantial than those in
Button and Primus, this Article examined a case study of attorneys
representing Guantánamo detainees under the shadow of warrantless
wiretapping. The threat of surveillance restricted the lawyers’ ability to
engage in fact-gathering communications with clients, witnesses,
experts, and others, as well as to explore legal theories with co-counsel
and, ultimately, to present evidence and arguments to the courts. The
obstacles in individual cases arguably created a chilling effect on
litigation that challenged U.S. policies.
Viewing the Supreme Court’s earlier jurisprudence in light of the
Guantánamo case study, five factors emerge as keys to the definition
of litigation as political expression: (1) whether the attorney or client
is motivated by a political message; (2) whether the client or potential
client is a vulnerable minority; (3) whether the litigation advocates an
unpopular or dissident viewpoint; (4) whether the legal services are
provided free of charge; and (5) whether there is a government
adversary on the other side. The example of warrantless wiretapping
reveals new questions that previous cases have not explored but which
will now require attention: the constitutional significance of factgathering, the scope of communications covered, and the degree of
incidental burdens considered for constitutional review. The
Guantánamo case study also highlights the First Amendment values
that underlie the lawyers’ work, thereby reminding us of the
importance of tackling these doctrinal puzzles with renewed vigor.
In future research, I hope to explore in more depth the sociological
implications of recognizing lawyers’ right to engage in
communications in support of litigation. I imagine that when
disenfranchised clients face strong opposition, in the form of either
legal or political obstacles — legal services clients deprived of effective
counsel by congressional funding restrictions,293 or Guantánamo
detainees denied access to Article III courts based on their
characterization as “enemy combatants”294 — lawyers might best serve
293
See generally Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (striking
down Congressional restrictions that prevented Legal Services attorneys from
challenging welfare laws).
294
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008) (ruling on provision of
Military Commissions Act that deprived federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas
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those clients by articulating claims based on their own rights. As our
history demonstrates, the executive and legislative branches of our
government have at times stripped vulnerable, unpopular groups of
legal claims one might previously have understood them to enjoy. I
predict that even when judges are disinclined to credit the claims of
despised or disregarded members of society, they might still be
empathetic to the claims of the lawyers, whom they view as neutral as
to the moral values of the clients’ actions and aims, and also as
fulfilling a noble obligation in maintaining that neutrality while
advancing the clients’ positions.
If lawyers advance societal interests through their unique role in the
expression of ideas through litigation, as trustees of justice or officers
of the court, perhaps they ought to have the enforceable right to bring
to the attention of the judiciary impositions on their ability to
advocate. This would require that the lawyers hold their own,
nonderivative First Amendment rights to express views through
litigation. It could permit them to challenge limitations on their
advocacy even if their clients did not have the capacity to bring such
claims. As the Guantánamo example highlights, if one of the roles of
the lawyer is to bring claims to the courts so the judiciary can check
excesses of other branches of government, then instilling lawyers with
the power to pursue such claims may make sense, because the
excesses may include stripping clients or potential clients of any
enforceable rights of their own.

corpus petitions for alleged enemy combatants) (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(e) (West
2007)).

